Package 'CoopGame'

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Type Package

Title Important Concepts of Cooperative Game Theory

Version 0.2.2

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Description The theory of cooperative games with transferable utility offers useful insights into the way parties can share gains from cooperation and secure sustainable agreements, see e.g. one of the books by Chakravarty, Mitra and Sarkar (2015, ISBN:978-1107058798) or by Driessen (1988, ISBN:978-9027727299) for more details. A comprehensive set of tools for cooperative game theory with transferable utility is provided. Users can create special families of cooperative games, like e.g. bankruptcy games, cost sharing games and weighted voting games. There are functions to check various game properties and to compute five different set-valued solution concepts for cooperative games. A large number of point-valued solution concepts is available reflecting the diverse application areas of cooperative game theory. Some of these point-valued solution concepts can be used to analyze weighted voting games and measure the influence of individual voters within a voting body. There are routines for visualizing both set-valued and point-valued solutions in the case of three or four players.

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Encoding UTF-8

Depends R (>= 2.10.0), utils, geometry (>= 0.3-6), rcdd (>= 1.1)

Imports gtools (>= 3.5.0), methods (>= 3.3.1)

Suggests testthat, knitr, rmarkdown, rgl

RoxygenNote 7.1.1

VignetteBuilder knitr, rmarkdown

NeedsCompilation no

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Contents

absolutePublicGoodValue

Compute absolute Public Good value

Description

absolutePublicGoodValue calculates the absolute Public Good value for a specified nonnegative TU game. Note that in general the absolute Public Good value is not an efficient vector, i.e. the sum of its entries is not always 1.

Usage

```
absolutePublicGoodValue(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length $2^n - 1$ representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Value

Absolute Public Good value for specified nonnegative game

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Holler M.J. and Li X. (1995) "From public good index to public value. An axiomatic approach and generalization", Control and Cybernetics 24, pp. 257–270

Bertini C. and Stach I. (2015) "On Public Values and Power Indices", Decision Making in Manufacturing and Services 9(1), pp. 9–25

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v <- c(1,2,3,4,0,0,0)
absolutePublicGoodValue(v)


v=c(0,0,0,0.7,11,0,15)
absolutePublicGoodValue(v)
#[1] 26.7 15.7 26.0
```

---

absolutePublicHelpChiValue

Compute absolute Public Help value Chi

Description

Calculates the absolute Public Help value Chi for a specified nonnegative TU game. Note that in general the absolute Public Help value Chi is not an efficient vector, i.e. the sum of its entries is not always 1. Hence no drawing routine for the absolute Public Help value Chi is provided. Note that the greek letter Xi (instead of Chi) was used in the original paper by Bertini and Stach (2015).

Usage

```
absolutePublicHelpChiValue(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
           TU game with n players

Value

Absolute Public Help value Chi for specified nonnegative game

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Bertini C. and Stach I. (2015) "On Public Values and Power Indices", Decision Making in Manufacturing and Services 9(1), pp. 9–25

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,2,2,0,2)
absolutePublicHelpChiValue(v)
```

---

absolutePublicHelpValue

Compute absolute Public Help value Theta

Description

absolutePublicHelpValue calculates the absolute Public Help value Theta for a specified nonnegative TU game. Note that in general the absolute Public Help value Theta is not an efficient vector, i.e. the sum of its entries is not always 1. Hence no drawing routine for the absolute Public Help Value is provided.

Usage

```
absolutePublicHelpValue(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                TU game with n players

Value

Absolute Public Help value Theta for specified simple game

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Bertini C. and Stach I. (2015) "On Public Values and Power Indices", Decision Making in Manufacturing and Services 9(1), pp. 9–25

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,0.7,11,0,15)
absolutePublicHelpValue(v)
```

---

apexGame *Construct an apex game*

Description

Create a list containing all information about a specified apex game:
A coalition can only win (and hence obtain the value 1) if it
a) contains both the apex player and one additional player
or
b) contains all players except for the apex player.
Any non-winning coalitions obtain the value `0`.
Note that apex games are always simple games.

Usage

```
apexGame(n, apexPlayer)
```

Arguments

n   represents the number of players

apexPlayer   specifies the number of the apex player

Value

A list with three elements representing the apex game (n, apexPlayer, Game vector v)

Related Functions

apexGameValue, apexGameVector

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

References

Peters H. (2015) *Game Theory: A Multi-Leveled Approach*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 164–165

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
apexGameVector(n=3,apexPlayer=2)


library(CoopGame)
#Example with four players, apex player is number 3
(vv<-apexGame(n=4,apexPlayer=3))
```

```
#$n
#[1] 4

#$apexPlayer
#[1] 4

#$v
# [1] 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
```

---

apexGameValue   *Compute value of a coalition for an apex game*

Description

Coalition value for an apex game:
For further information see apexGame

Usage

```
apexGameValue(S, n, apexPlayer)
```

Arguments

S	numeric vector with coalition of players
n	represents the number of players
apexPlayer	specifies the number of the apex player

Value

value of coalition S

Author(s)

Alexandra Tiukkel

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peters H. (2015) *Game Theory: A Multi-Leveled Approach*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 164–165

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
apexGameValue(c(1,2),3,2)


library(CoopGame)
apexGameValue(c(1,2,3,4),4,3)
# Output:
# [1] 1
```

---

apexGameVector   *Compute game vector for an apex game*

Description

Game vector for an apex game:
For further information see apexGame

Usage

```
apexGameVector(n, apexPlayer)
```

Arguments

n	represents the number of players
apexPlayer	specifies the number of the apex player

Value

Game vector for the apex game

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peters H. (2015) *Game Theory: A Multi-Leveled Approach*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 164–165

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
apexGameVector(n=3,apexPlayer=2)


library(CoopGame)
(v <- apexGameVector(n=4,apexPlayer=3))
#[1] 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
```

---

bankruptcyGame   *Construct a bankruptcy game*

Description

Create a list containing all information about a specified bankruptcy game:
The list contains the number of players, the claims vector, the estate and the bankruptcy game
vector. Bankruptcy games are defined by a vector of debts d of n creditors (players) and an estate
E less than the sum of the debt vector. The roots of bankruptcy games can be traced back to the
Babylonian Talmud.

Usage

```
bankruptcyGame(n, d, E)
```

Arguments

n	represents the number of players
d	numeric vector which contains the claims of each player in a bankruptcy game
E	is the value of the estate in a bankruptcy game

Value

A list with four elements representing the specified bankruptcy game (n, d, E, Game vector v)

Related Functions

bankruptcyGameValue, bankruptcyGameVector

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

O'Neill, B. (1982) "A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud", Mathematical Social Sciences 4(2), pp. 345 – 371

Aumann R.J. and Maschler M. (1985) "Game Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud", Journal of Economic Theory 36(1), pp. 195 – 213

Aumann R.J. (2002) "Game Theory in the Talmud", Research Bulletin Series on Jewish Law and Economics, 12 pages.

Gura E. and Maschler M. (2008) *Insights into Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 166–204

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
bankruptcyGame(n=3, d=c(1,2,3), E=4)


#Estate division problem from Babylonian Talmud
#from paper by Aumann (2002) with E=300
library(CoopGame)
bankruptcyGame(n=3,d=c(100,200,300),E=300)
#Output
#$n
#[1] 3

#$d
#[1] 100 200 300

#$E
#[1] 300

#$v
#[1]   0   0   0   0 100 200 300
```

---

bankruptcyGameValue *Compute value of a coalition for a bankruptcy game*

Description

Coalition value for a specified bankruptcy game:
For further information see bankruptcyGame

Usage

```
bankruptcyGameValue(S, d, E)
```

Arguments

S	numeric vector with coalition of players
d	numeric vector which contains the claims of each player in a bankruptcy game
E	is the value of the estate in a bankruptcy game

Value

A positive value if the sum of the claims outside of coalition S is less than E else 0

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

O'Neill, B. (1982) "A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud", Mathematical Social Sciences 4(2), pp. 345 – 371

Aumann R.J. and Maschler M. (1985) "Game Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud", Journal of Economic Theory 36(1), pp. 195 – 213

Aumann R.J. (2002) "Game Theory in the Talmud", Research Bulletin Series on Jewish Law and Economics, 12 pages.

Gura E. and Maschler M. (2008) *Insights into Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 166–204

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
bankruptcyGameValue(S=c(2,3),d=c(1,2,3),E=4)


#Estate division problem from Babylonian Talmud
#from paper by Aumann (2002) with E=300
library(CoopGame)
bankruptcyGameValue(S=c(2,3),d=c(100,200,300),E=300)
#Output
#[1] 200
```

---

bankruptcyGameVector   *Compute game vector for a bankruptcy game*

Description

Game vector for a specified bankruptcy game:
For further information see bankruptcyGame

Usage

```
bankruptcyGameVector(n, d, E)
```

Arguments

n	represents the number of players
d	numeric vector which contains the claims of each player in a bankruptcy game
E	is the value of the estate in a bankruptcy game

Value

Game Vector where each element contains a positive value if the sum of the claims outside of coalition 'S' is less than E else 0

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

O'Neill, B. (1982) "A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud", Mathematical Social Sciences 4(2), pp. 345 – 371

Aumann R.J. and Maschler M. (1985) "Game Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud", Journal of Economic Theory 36(1), pp. 195 – 213

Aumann R.J. (2002) "Game Theory in the Talmud", Research Bulletin Series on Jewish Law and Economics, 12 pages.

Gura E. and Maschler M. (2008) *Insights into Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 166–204

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
bankruptcyGameVector(n=3, d=c(1,2,3), E=4)


#Estate division problem from Babylonian Talmud
#from paper by Aumann (2002) with E=300
library(CoopGame)
bankruptcyGameVector(n=3,d=c(100,200,300),E=300)
#Output
#[1] 0   0   0   0 100 200 300
```

---

banzhafValue   *Compute Banzhaf value*

Description

banzhafValue computes the Banzhaf value for a specified TU game The Banzhaf value itself is an alternative to the Shapley value.

Conceptually, the Banzhaf value is very similar to the Shapley value. Its main difference from the Shapley value is that the Banzhaf value is coalition based rather than permutation based. Note that in general the Banzhaf vector is not efficient! In this sense this implementation of the Banzhaf value could also be referred to as the non-normalized Banzhaf value, see formula (20.6) in on p. 368 of the book by Hans Peters (2015).

Usage

```
banzhafValue(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Value

The return value is a numeric vector which contains the Banzhaf value for each player.

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peters H. (2015) *Game Theory: A Multi-Leveled Approach*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 367–370

Chakravarty S.R., Mitra M. and Sarkar P. (2015) *A Course on Cooperative Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 118–119

Gambarelli G. (2011) "Banzhaf value", Encyclopedia of Power, SAGE Publications, pp. 53–54

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,1,2,1,4)
banzhafValue(v)


#Example from paper by Gambarelli (2011)
library(CoopGame)
```

```
v=c(0,0,0,1,2,1,3)
banzhafValue(v)
#[1] 1.25 0.75 1.25
```

---

baruaChakravartySarkarIndex

Compute Barua Chakravarty Sarkar index

Description

Calculates the Barua Chakravarty Sarkar index for a specified simple TU game. Note that in general the Barua Chakravarty Sarkar index is not an efficient vector, i.e. the sum of its entries is not always 1. Hence no drawing routine for the Barua Chakravarty Sarkar index is provided.

Usage

```
baruaChakravartySarkarIndex(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Value

Barua Chakravarty Sarkar index for specified simple game

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Barua R., Chakravarty S.R. and Sarkar P. (2012) "Measuring p-power of voting", Journal of Economic Theory and Social Development 1(1), pp. 81–91

Chakravarty S.R., Mitra M. and Sarkar P. (2015) *A Course on Cooperative Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 120–123

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,1,1,0,1)
baruaChakravartySarkarIndex(v)
```

---

belongsToCore   *Check if point is core element*

Description

belongsToCore checks if a given point is in the core

Usage

```
belongsToCore(x, v)
```

Arguments

x	numeric vector containing allocations for each player
v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Value

TRUE for a point belonging to the core and FALSE otherwise

Author(s)

Franz Mueller

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Gillies D.B. (1953) *Some Theorems on n-person Games*, Ph.D. Thesis, Princeton University Press.

Aumann R.J. (1961) "The core of a cooperative game without side payments", Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 98(3), pp. 539–552

Peleg B. and Sudholter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 27–49

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 686–747

Osborne M.J. and Rubinstein A. (1994) *A Course in Game Theory*, MIT Press, pp. 257–275

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v = c(0,1,2,3,4,5,6)
belongsToCore(c(1,2,3),v)
```

---

belongsToCoreCover *Check if point is core cover element*

Description

belongsToCoreCover checks if the point is in the core cover

Usage

```
belongsToCoreCover(x, v)
```

Arguments

x	numeric vector containing allocations for each player
v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Value

TRUE if point belongs to core cover, FALSE otherwise

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Tijs S.H. and Lipperts F.A.S. (1982) "The hypercube and the core cover of n-person cooperative games", Cahiers du Centre d' Etudes de Researche Operationelle 24, pp. 27–37

Branzei R., Dimitrov D. and Tijs S. (2006) *Models in cooperative game theory*, Springer, p. 21

Chakravarty S.R., Mitra M. and Sarkar P. (2015) *A Course on Cooperative Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 45–46

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
belongsToCoreCover(x=c(1,1,1), v=c(0,0,0,1,1,1,3))


library(CoopGame)
v <- c(0,0,0,3,3,3,6)
belongsToCoreCover(x=c(2,2,2),v)
#[1] TRUE
belongsToCoreCover(x=c(1,2,4),v)
#[1] FALSE
```

---

belongsToImputationset

Check if point is imputation

Description

belongsToImputationset checks if the point belongs to the imputation set

Usage

```
belongsToImputationset(x, v)
```

Arguments

x	numeric vector containing allocations for each player
v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Value

TRUE for a point belonging to the imputation set and FALSE otherwise

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 20

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, p. 674

Osborne M.J. and Rubinstein A. (1994) *A Course in Game Theory*, MIT Press, p. 278

Narahari Y. (2015) *Game Theory and Mechanism Design*, World Scientific Publishing, p. 407

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
belongsToImputationset(x=c(1,0.5,0.5), v=c(0,0,0,1,1,1,2))


library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,1,2,3,4,5,6)

#Point belongs to imputation set:
belongsToImputationset(x=c(1.5,1,3.5),v)

#Point does not belong to imputation set:
```

```
belongsToImputationset(x=c(2.05,2,2),v)
```

---

belongsToReasonableSet

Check if point is element of reasonable set

Description

belongsToReasonableSet checks if the point is in the reasonable set

Usage

```
belongsToReasonableSet(x, v)
```

Arguments

x   numeric vector containing allocations for each player

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                TU game with n players

Value

TRUE if point belongs to reasonable set, FALSE otherwise

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Milnor J.W. (1953) *Reasonable Outcomes for N-person Games*, Rand Corporation, Research Memorandum RM 916.

Branzei R., Dimitrov D. and Tijs S. (2006) *Models in cooperative game theory*, Springer, p. 21

Chakravarty S.R., Mitra M. and Sarkar P. (2015) *A Course on Cooperative Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 43–44

Gerard-Varet L.A. and Zamir S. (1987) "Remarks on the reasonable set of outcomes in a general coalition function form game", Int. Journal of Game Theory 16(2), pp. 123–143

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
belongsToReasonableSet(x=c(1,0.5,0.5), v=c(0,0,0,1,1,1,2))


library(CoopGame)
v <- c(0,0,0,3,3,3,6)
belongsToReasonableSet(x=c(2,2,2),v)
#[1] TRUE
belongsToReasonableSet(x=c(1,2,4),v)
#[1] FALSE
```

---

belongsToWeberset   *Check if point is element of Weber Set*

Description

belongsToWeberset checks if the point is in the Weber Set

Usage

```
belongsToWeberset(x, v)
```

Arguments

x	numeric vector containing allocations for each player
v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Value

TRUE if point belongs to Weber Set and FALSE otherwise

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

References

Weber R.J. (1988) "Probabilistic values for games". In: Roth A.E. (Ed.), The Shapley Value. Essays in in honor of Lloyd S. Shapley, Cambridge University Press, pp. 101–119

Peters H. (2015) *Game Theory: A Multi-Leveled Approach*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 327–329

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
belongsToWeberset(x=c(1,0.5,0.5), v=c(0,0,0,1,1,1,2))


library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,1,2,3,4,5,6)

#Point belongs to Weber Set:
belongsToWeberset(x=c(1.5,1,3.5),v)

#Point does not belong to Weber Set:
belongsToWeberset(x=c(2.05,2,2),v)
```

---

cardinalityGame	*Construct a cardinality game*

Description

Create a list containing all information about a specified cardinality game:
For a cardinality game the worth of each coalition is simply the number of the members of the coalition.

Usage

```
cardinalityGame(n)
```

Arguments

n   represents the number of players

Value

A list with two elements representing the cardinality game (n, Game vector v)

Related Functions

cardinalityGameValue, cardinalityGameVector

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
cardinalityGame(n=3)


library(CoopGame)
#Example: Cardinality function for four players
(vv<-cardinalityGame(n=4))
#$n
#[1] 4

#$v
#[1] 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4
```

---

cardinalityGameValue   *Compute value of a coalition for a cardinality game*

Description

Coalition value for a cardinality game:
For further information see [cardinalityGame](#)

Usage

```
cardinalityGameValue(S)
```

Arguments

S   numeric vector with coalition of players

Value

The return value is the cardinality, i.e. the number of elements, of coalition S

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
S=c(1,2,4,5)
cardinalityGameValue(S)
```

cardinalityGameVector   *Compute game vector for a cardinality game*

Description

Game vector for a cardinality game:
For further information see [cardinalityGame](#)

Usage

```
cardinalityGameVector(n)
```

Arguments

n   represents the number of players

Value

Game vector for the cardinality game

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
cardinalityGameVector(n=3)


library(CoopGame)
(v <- cardinalityGameVector(n=4))
#[1] 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4
```

---

centroidCore   *Compute centroid of core*

Description

Calculates the centroid of the core for specified game.

Usage

```
centroidCore(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Value

Calculates the centroid of the core for a game specified by a game vector v.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Gillies D.B. (1953) *Some Theorems on n-person Games*, Ph.D. Thesis, Princeton University Press.

Aumann R.J. (1961) "The core of a cooperative game without side payments", Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 98(3), pp. 539–552

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 27–49

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 686–747

Osborne M.J. and Rubinstein A. (1994) *A Course in Game Theory*, MIT Press, pp. 257–275

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,2,2,3,5)
centroidCore(v)
```

---

centroidCoreCover   *Compute centroid of the core cover*

Description

Calculates the centroid of the core cover for specified game.

Usage

```
centroidCoreCover(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Value

Centroid of the core cover for a quasi-balanced game specified by a game vector

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Tijs S.H. and Lipperts F.A.S. (1982) "The hypercube and the core cover of n-person cooperative games", Cahiers du Centre d' Etudes de Researche Operationelle 24, pp. 27–37

Branzei R., Dimitrov D. and Tijs S. (2006) *Models in cooperative game theory*, Springer, p. 21

Chakravarty S.R., Mitra M. and Sarkar P. (2015) *A Course on Cooperative Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 45–46

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,2,2,3,5)
centroidCoreCover(v)
```

---

centroidImputationSet *Compute centroid of the imputation set*

Description

Calculates the centroid of the imputation set for specified game.

Usage

```
centroidImputationSet(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Value

Calculates the centroid of the imputation set for a game specified by a game vector.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 20

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, p. 674

Osborne M.J. and Rubinstein A. (1994) *A Course in Game Theory*, MIT Press, p. 278

Narahari Y. (2015) *Game Theory and Mechanism Design*, World Scientific Publishing, p. 407

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,2,2,3,5)
centroidImputationSet(v)
```

---

centroidReasonableSet   *Compute centroid of reasonable set*

Description

Calculates the centroid of the reasonable set for specified game.

Usage

```
centroidReasonableSet(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                  TU game with n players

Value

Calculates the centroid of the reasonable set for a game specified by a game vector.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Milnor J.W. (1953) *Reasonable Outcomes for N-person Games*, Rand Corporation, Research Memorandum RM 916.

Branzei R., Dimitrov D. and Tijs S. (2006) *Models in cooperative game theory*, Springer, p. 21

Chakravarty S.R., Mitra M. and Sarkar P. (2015) *A Course on Cooperative Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 43–44

Gerard-Varet L.A. and Zamir S. (1987) "Remarks on the reasonable set of outcomes in a general coalition function form game", Int. Journal of Game Theory 16(2), pp. 123–143

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,2,2,3,5)
centroidReasonableSet(v)
```

---

centroidWeberSet   *Compute centroid of Weber set*

Description

Calculates the centroid of the Weber set for specified game.

Usage

```
centroidWeberSet(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                     TU game with n players

Value

Calculates the centroid of the Weber set for a game specified by a game vector.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Weber R.J. (1988) "Probabilistic values for games". In: Roth A.E. (Ed.), The Shapley Value. Essays in in honor of Lloyd S. Shapley, Cambridge University Press, pp. 101–119

Peters H. (2015) *Game Theory: A Multi-Leveled Approach*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 327–329

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,2,2,3,5)
centroidWeberSet(v)
```

---

colemanCollectivityPowerIndex

Compute Coleman Power index of a Collectivity to Act

Description

Calculates the Coleman Power index of a Collectivity to Act for a specified simple TU game. Note that in general the Coleman Power index of a Collectivity to Act is not an efficient vector, i.e. the sum of its entries is not always 1. Note also that the the Coleman Power index of a Collectivity to Act is identical for each player, i.e. the result for each player is the number of winning coalitions divided by 2^n. Hence no drawing routine for the Coleman Power index of a Collectivity to Act is provided.

Usage

```
colemanCollectivityPowerIndex(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length $2^n - 1$ representing the values of the coalitions of a
                      TU game with n players

Value

Coleman Power index of a Collectivity to Act for specified simple game

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Coleman J.S. (1971) "Control of collectivities and the power of a collectivity to act". In: Liberman B. (Ed.), Social Choice, Gordon and Breach, pp. 269–300

De Keijzer B. (2008) "A survey on the computation of power indices", Technical Report, Delft University of Technology, p. 18

Bertini C. and Stach I. (2011) "Coleman index", Encyclopedia of Power, SAGE Publications, p. 117–119

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,1,1,0,1)
colemanCollectivityPowerIndex(v)
```

---

colemanInitiativePowerIndex

Compute Coleman Initiative Power index

Description

Calculates the Coleman Initiative Power index for a specified simple TU game. Note that in general the Coleman Initiative Power index is not an efficient vector, i.e. the sum of its entries is not always 1. Hence no drawing routine for the Coleman Initiative Power index is provided.

Usage

```
colemanInitiativePowerIndex(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Value

Coleman Initiative Power index for specified simple game

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Coleman J.S. (1971) "Control of collectivities and the power of a collectivity to act". In: Liberman B. (Ed.), Social Choice, Gordon and Breach, pp. 269–300

Chakravarty S.R., Mitra M. and Sarkar P. (2015) *A Course on Cooperative Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 120–123

De Keijzer B. (2008) "A survey on the computation of power indices", Technical Report, Delft University of Technology, p. 18

Bertini C. and Stach I. (2011) "Coleman index", Encyclopedia of Power, SAGE Publications, p. 117–119

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,1,1,0,1)
colemanInitiativePowerIndex(v)
```

---

colemanPreventivePowerIndex

Compute Coleman Preventive Power index

Description

Calculates the Coleman Preventive Power index for a specified simple TU game. Note that in general the Coleman Preventive Power index is not an efficient vector, i.e. the sum of its entries is not always 1. Hence no drawing routine for the Coleman Preventive Power index is provided.

Usage

```
colemanPreventivePowerIndex(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                TU game with n players

Value

Coleman Preventive Power index for specified simple game

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Coleman J.S. (1971) "Control of collectivities and the power of a collectivity to act". In: Liberman B. (Ed.), Social Choice, Gordon and Breach, pp. 269–300

Chakravarty S.R., Mitra M. and Sarkar P. (2015) *A Course on Cooperative Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 120–123

De Keijzer B. (2008) "A survey on the computation of power indices", Technical Report, Delft University of Technology, p. 18

Bertini C. and Stach I. (2011) "Coleman index", Encyclopedia of Power, SAGE Publications, p. 117–119

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,1,1,0,1)
colemanPreventivePowerIndex(v)
```

---

coreCoverVertices   *Compute core cover vertices*

Description

Calculates the core cover for a given game vector

Usage

```
coreCoverVertices(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                           TU game with n players

Value

rows of the matrix are the vertices of the core cover

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Tijs S.H. and Lipperts F.A.S. (1982) "The hypercube and the core cover of n-person cooperative games", Cahiers du Centre d' Etudes de Researche Operationelle 24, pp. 27–37

Branzei R., Dimitrov D. and Tijs S. (2006) *Models in cooperative game theory*, Springer, p. 21

Chakravarty S.R., Mitra M. and Sarkar P. (2015) *A Course on Cooperative Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 45–46

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
coreCoverVertices(c(0,0,0,1,1,1,3))


library(CoopGame)
v <- c(0,0,0,3,3,3,6)
coreCoverVertices(v)
#       [,1] [,2] [,3]
# [1,]    3    0    3
# [2,]    0    3    3
# [3,]    3    3    0
```

---

coreVertices   *Compute core vertices*

Description

Calculates the core vertices for given game vector

Usage

```
coreVertices(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                     TU game with n players

Value

rows of the matrix are the vertices of the core

Author(s)

Franz Mueller

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Gillies D.B. (1953) *Some Theorems on n-person Games*, Ph.D. Thesis, Princeton University Press.

Aumann R.J. (1961) "The core of a cooperative game without side payments", Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 98(3), pp. 539–552

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 27–49

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 686–747

Osborne M.J. and Rubinstein A. (1994) *A Course in Game Theory*, MIT Press, pp. 257–275

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
coreVertices(c(0,0,0,1,1,1,3))


#In the following case the core consists of a single point
v1 = c(0,1,2,3,4,5,6)
coreVertices(v1)
#     [,1] [,2] [,3]
#[1,]    1    2    3
```

```
#Users may also want to try the following commands:
coreVertices(c(0,0,0,60,80,100,135))
coreVertices(c(5,2,4,7,15,15,15,15,15,15,20,20,20,20,35))
coreVertices(c(0,0,0,0,0,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,15,15,15,15,15,15,15,15,15,15,30,30,30,30,30,60))
```

---

costSharingGame   *Construct a cost sharing game*

Description

Create a list containing all information about a specified cost sharing game:
The user may specify the cost function of a cost allocation problem. A corresponding savings game
will be calculated. The savings game specified by the game vector v will work like an ordinary TU
game.

Usage

```
costSharingGame(n, Costs)
```

Arguments

n	represents the number of players
Costs	A vector containing the costs each coalition has to pay

Value

A list with three elements representing the specified cost sharing game (n, Costs, Game vector v)

Related Functions

costSharingGameValue, costSharingGameVector

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

References

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 14–16

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 667–668

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
costSharingGame(n=3, Costs=c(2,2,2,3,3,3,4))


#Example with 3 students sharing an appartment:
#-----------------------------
#| costs     | A | B | C |
#- ---------------------------
#|single     | 300 | 270 | 280 |
#|appartment |     |     |     |
#-----------------------------
#
#Appartment for 2 persons => costs: 410
#Appartment for 3 persons => costs: 550

#Savings for all combinations sharing appartments
library(CoopGame)
(vv <- costSharingGame(n=3, Costs=c(300,270,280,410,410,410,550)))
#Output:
#$n
#[1] 3

#$Costs
#[1] 300 270 280 410 410 410 550

#$v
#[1]   0   0   0 160 170 140 300
```

---

costSharingGameValue   *Compute value of a coalition for a cost game*

Description

Coalition value for a cost sharing game:
For further information see costSharingGame

Usage

```
costSharingGameValue(S, Costs)
```

Arguments

| S | numeric vector with coalition of players |
| Costs | A vector containing the costs each coalition has to pay |

Value

Cost savings of coalition S as compared to singleton coalitions

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 14–16

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 667–668

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
costSharingGameValue(S=c(1,2), Costs=c(2,2,2,3,3,3,4))


#Example with 3 students sharing an appartment:
#-----------------------------
#| costs     | A | B | C |
#- --------------------------
#|single     | 300 | 270 | 280 |
#|appartment |     |     |     |
#-----------------------------
#
#Appartment for 2 persons => costs: 410
#Appartment for 3 persons => costs: 550

#Savings when A and B share appartment
library(CoopGame)
costSharingGameValue(S=c(1,2),Costs=c(300,270,280,410,410,410,550))
#Output:
#[1] 160
```

---

costSharingGameVector *Compute game vector for a cost sharing game*

Description

Coalition vector for a cost sharing game:
For further information see costSharingGame

Usage

```
costSharingGameVector(n, Costs)
```

Arguments

n	represents the number of players
Costs	A vector containing the costs each coalition has to pay

Value

Game vector with cost-savings of each coalition S as compared to singleton coalitions.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

References

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 14–16

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 667–668

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
costSharingGameVector(n=3, Costs=c(2,2,2,3,3,3,4))


#Example with 3 students sharing an appartment:
#-----------------------------
#| costs     | A | B | C |
#- ---------------------------
#|single     | 300 | 270 | 280 |
#|appartment |     |     |     |
#-----------------------------
#
#Appartment for 2 persons => costs: 410
#Appartment for 3 persons => costs: 550

#Savings for all combinations sharing appartments
library(CoopGame)
(v=costSharingGameVector(n=3, Costs=c(300,270,280,410,410,410,550)))
#Output:
#[1]  0   0   0 160 170 140 300
```

---

createBitMatrix   *create bit matrix*

Description

createBitMatrix creates a bit matrix with (numberOfPlayers+1) columns and (2^numberOfPlayers-1) rows which contains all possible coalitions (apart from the null coalition) for the set of all players. Each player is represented by a column which describes if this player is either participating (value 1) or not participating (value 0). The last column (named cVal) contains the values of each coalition. Accordingly, each row of the bit matrix expresses a coalition as a subset of all players.

Usage

```
createBitMatrix(n, A = NULL)
```

Arguments

n   represents the number of players
A   Numeric vector of appropriate size

Value

The return is a bit matrix containing all possible coalitions apart from the empty coalition

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
createBitMatrix(3,c(0,0,0,60,60,60,72))


library(CoopGame)
A=weightedVotingGameVector(n=3,w=c(1,2,3),q=5)
bm=createBitMatrix(3,A)
bm
# Output:
#           cVal
# [1,] 1 0 0    0
# [2,] 0 1 0    0
# [3,] 0 0 1    0
# [4,] 1 1 0    0
# [5,] 1 0 1    0
# [6,] 0 1 1    1
# [7,] 1 1 1    1
```

---

deeganPackelIndex   *Compute Deegan-Packel index*

Description

deeganPackelIndex calculates the Deegan-Packel index for simple games

Usage

```
deeganPackelIndex(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                     TU game with n players

Value

Deegan-Packel index for a specified simple game

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Michael Maerz

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Deegan J. and Packel E.W. (1978) "A new index of power for simple n-person games", Int. Journal
of Game Theory 7(2), pp. 151–161

Holler M.J. and Illing G. (2006) "Einfuehrung in die Spieltheorie". 6th Edition (in German),
Springer, pp. 323–324

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
deeganPackelIndex(c(0,0,0,0,1,0,1))


#Example from HOLLER & ILLING (2006), chapter 6.3.3
#Expected result: dpv=(18/60,9/60,11/60,11/60,11/60)
library(CoopGame)
v1=weightedVotingGameVector(n = 5, w=c(35,20,15,15,15), q=51)
deeganPackelIndex(v1)
#Output (as expected, see HOLLER & ILLING chapter 6.3.3) :
#[1] 0.3000000 0.1500000 0.1833333 0.1833333 0.1833333
```

---

dictatorGame   *Construct a dictator game*

Description

Create a list containing all information about a specified dictator game:
Any coalitions including the dictator receive coalition value 1. All the other coalitions, i.e. each
and every coalition not containing the dictator, receives coalition value 0.
Note that dictator games are always simple games.

Usage

```
dictatorGame(n, dictator)
```

Arguments

n	represents the number of players
dictator	Number of the dictator

Value

A list with three elements representing the dictator game (n, dictator, Game vector v)

Related Functions

dictatorGameValue, dictatorGameVector

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peters H. (2015) *Game Theory: A Multi-Leveled Approach*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 295

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, p. 764

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
dictatorGame(n=3,dictator=2)


library(CoopGame)
dictatorGame(n=4,dictator=2)
#Output:
#$n
#[1] 4
```

```
#$dictator
#[1] 2

#$v
#[1] 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
```

---

dictatorGameValue   *Compute value of a coalition for a dictator game*

Description

Coalition value for a dictator game:
For further information see [dictatorGame](#)

Usage

```
dictatorGameValue(S, dictator)
```

Arguments

S	numeric vector with coalition of players
dictator	Number of the dictator

Value

1 if dictator is involved in coalition, 0 otherwise.

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peters H. (2015) *Game Theory: A Multi-Leveled Approach*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 295

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, p. 764

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
dictatorGameValue(S=c(1,2,3),dictator=2)
```

---

dictatorGameVector *Compute game vector for a dictator game*

Description

Game vector for a dictator game:
For further information see dictatorGame

Usage

```
dictatorGameVector(n, dictator)
```

Arguments

n   represents the number of players

dictator   Number of the dictator

Value

Game vector where each element contains 1 if dictator is involved, 0 otherwise.

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peters H. (2015) *Game Theory: A Multi-Leveled Approach*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 295

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, p. 764

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
dictatorGameVector(n=3,dictator=2)
```

---

disruptionNucleolus　*Compute disruption nucleolus*

Description

Computes the disruption nucleolus of a balanced TU game with n players. Note that the disruption nucleolus needs to be a member of the core.

Usage

```
disruptionNucleolus(v)
```

Arguments

v　　　　　　　　Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Value

Numeric vector of length n representing the disruption nucleolus of the specified TU game

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

References

Littlechild S.C. and Vaidya K.G. (1976) "The propensity to disrupt and the disruption nucleolus of a characteristic function game", Int. Journal of Game Theory 5(2), pp. 151–161

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v<-c(0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1)
disruptionNucleolus(v)


library(CoopGame)
exampleVector<-c(0,0,0,0,2,3,4,1,3,2,8,11,6.5,9.5,14)
disruptionNucleolus(exampleVector)
#[1] 3.193548 4.754839 2.129032 3.922581
```

---

divideTheDollarGame   *Construct a divide-the-dollar game*

Description

Create a list containing all information about a specified divide-the-dollar game:
Returns a divide-the-dollar game with n players:
This sample game is taken from the book 'Social and Economic Networks' by Matthew O. Jackson
(see p. 413 ff.). If coalition S has at least n/2 members it generates a value of 1, otherwise 0.
Note that divide-the-dollar games are always simple games.

Usage

```
divideTheDollarGame(n)
```

Arguments

n   represents the number of players

Value

A list with two elements representing the divide-the-dollar game (n, Game vector v)

Related Functions

[divideTheDollarGameValue](#), [divideTheDollarGameVector](#)

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

References

Jackson M.O. (2008) *Social and Economic Networks*, Princeton University Press, p. 413

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
divideTheDollarGame(n=3)


#Example with four players
library(CoopGame)
(vv<-divideTheDollarGame(n=4))
#$n
#[1] 4

#$v
```

```
#[1] 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
```

---

divideTheDollarGameValue

Compute value of a coalition for a divide-the-dollar game

Description

Coalition value for a divide-the-dollar game:
For further information see divideTheDollarGame

Usage

```
divideTheDollarGameValue(S, n)
```

Arguments

S	numeric vector with coalition of players
n	represents the number of players

Value

value of coalition

Author(s)

Michael Maerz

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Jackson M.O. (2008) *Social and Economic Networks*, Princeton University Press, p. 413

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
S <- c(1,2)
divideTheDollarGameValue(S, n = 3)
```

divideTheDollarGameVector

Compute game vector for a divide-the-dollar game

Description

Game vector for a divide-the-dollar game:
For further information see divideTheDollarGame

Usage

```
divideTheDollarGameVector(n)
```

Arguments

n   represents the number of players

Value

Game vector for the specified divide-the-dollar game

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

References

Jackson M.O. (2008) *Social and Economic Networks*, Princeton University Press, p. 413

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
divideTheDollarGameVector(n=3)


library(CoopGame)
(v <- divideTheDollarGameVector(n=4))
#Output:
# [1] 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
```

---

drawCentroidCore   *draw centroid of the core for 3 or 4 players*

Description

drawCentroidCore draws the centroid of the core for 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawCentroidCore(
  v,
  holdOn = FALSE,
  colour = NA,
  label = TRUE,
  name = "centroid of core"
)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"
label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Gillies D.B. (1953) *Some Theorems on n-person Games*, Ph.D. Thesis, Princeton University Press.

Aumann R.J. (1961) "The core of a cooperative game without side payments", Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 98(3), pp. 539–552

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 27–49

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 686–747

Osborne M.J. and Rubinstein A. (1994) *A Course in Game Theory*, MIT Press, pp. 257–275

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v <-c(1,2,3,60,60,60,142)
drawCentroidCore(v,colour="green")
```

---

drawCentroidCoreCover   *draw centroid of core cover for 3 or 4 players*

Description

drawCentroidCoreCover draws the centroid of the core cover for 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawCentroidCoreCover(
  v,
  holdOn = FALSE,
  colour = NA,
  label = TRUE,
  name = "centroid of core cover"
)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"
label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Tijs S.H. and Lipperts F.A.S. (1982) "The hypercube and the core cover of n-person cooperative games", Cahiers du Centre d' Etudes de Researche Operationelle 24, pp. 27–37

Branzei R., Dimitrov D. and Tijs S. (2006) *Models in cooperative game theory*, Springer, p. 21

Chakravarty S.R., Mitra M. and Sarkar P. (2015) *A Course on Cooperative Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 45–46

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v <-c(1,2,3,60,60,60,142)
drawCentroidCoreCover(v,colour="black")
```

---

drawCentroidImputationSet

draw centroid of imputation set for 3 or 4 players

Description

drawCentroidImputationSet draws the centroid of the imputation set for 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawCentroidImputationSet(
  v,
  holdOn = FALSE,
  colour = NA,
  label = TRUE,
  name = "centroid of imputation set"
)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"
label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 20

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, p. 674

Osborne M.J. and Rubinstein A. (1994) *A Course in Game Theory*, MIT Press, p. 278

Narahari Y. (2015) *Game Theory and Mechanism Design*, World Scientific Publishing, p. 407

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v <-c(1,2,3,60,60,60,142)
drawCentroidImputationSet(v,colour="green")
```

---

drawCentroidReasonableSet

draw centroid of reasonable set for 3 or 4 players

Description

drawCentroidReasonableSet draws the centroid of the reasonable set for 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawCentroidReasonableSet(
  v,
  holdOn = FALSE,
  colour = NA,
  label = TRUE,
  name = "centroid of reasonable set"
)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"
label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Milnor J.W. (1953) *Reasonable Outcomes for N-person Games*, Rand Corporation, Research Memorandum RM 916.

Branzei R., Dimitrov D. and Tijs S. (2006) *Models in cooperative game theory*, Springer, p. 21

Chakravarty S.R., Mitra M. and Sarkar P. (2015) *A Course on Cooperative Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 43–44

Gerard-Varet L.A. and Zamir S. (1987) "Remarks on the reasonable set of outcomes in a general coalition function form game", Int. Journal of Game Theory 16(2), pp. 123–143

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v <-c(1,2,3,60,60,60,142)
drawCentroidReasonableSet(v,colour="green")
```

---

drawCentroidWeberSet   *draw centroid of Weber set for 3 or 4 players*

Description

drawCentroidWeberset draws the centroid of the Weber set for 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawCentroidWeberSet(
  v,
  holdOn = FALSE,
  colour = NA,
  label = TRUE,
  name = "centroid of Weber set"
)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"
label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Weber R.J. (1988) "Probabilistic values for games". In: Roth A.E. (Ed.), The Shapley Value. Essays in in honor of Lloyd S. Shapley, Cambridge University Press, pp. 101–119

Peters H. (2015) *Game Theory: A Multi-Leveled Approach*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 327–329

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v <-c(1,2,3,60,60,60,142)
drawCentroidWeberSet(v,colour="blue")
```

---

drawCore   *Draw core for 3 or 4 players*

Description

drawCore draws the core for 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawCore(v, holdOn = FALSE, colour = "red", label = FALSE, name = "Core")
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"
label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Gillies D.B. (1953) *Some Theorems on n-person Games*, Ph.D. Thesis, Princeton University Press.

Aumann R.J. (1961) "The core of a cooperative game without side payments", Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 98(3), pp. 539–552

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 27–49

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 686–747

Osborne M.J. and Rubinstein A. (1994) *A Course in Game Theory*, MIT Press, pp. 257–275

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v <- c(0,0,0,3,3,3,6)
drawCore(v)
```

---

drawCoreCover   *Draw core cover for 3 or 4 players*

Description

drawCoreCover draws the core cover for 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawCoreCover(
  v,
  holdOn = FALSE,
  colour = NA,
  label = FALSE,
  name = "Core Cover"
)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"
label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Tijs S.H. and Lipperts F.A.S. (1982) "The hypercube and the core cover of n-person cooperative games", Cahiers du Centre d' Etudes de Researche Operationelle 24, pp. 27–37

Branzei R., Dimitrov D. and Tijs S. (2006) *Models in cooperative game theory*, Springer, p. 21

Chakravarty S.R., Mitra M. and Sarkar P. (2015) *A Course on Cooperative Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 45–46

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v <- c(0,0,0,3,3,3,6)
drawCoreCover(v)
```

---

drawDeeganPackelIndex   *draw Deegan-Packel index for 3 or 4 players*

Description

drawDeeganPackelIndex draws the Deegan-Packel index for 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawDeeganPackelIndex(
  v,
  holdOn = FALSE,
  colour = NA,
  label = TRUE,
  name = "Deegan Packel Index"
)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"
label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Deegan J. and Packel E.W. (1978) "A new index of power for simple n-person games", Int. Journal of Game Theory 7(2), pp. 151–161

Holler M.J. and Illing G. (2006) "Einfuehrung in die Spieltheorie". 6th Edition (in German), Springer, pp. 323–324

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,1,1,0,1)
drawDeeganPackelIndex(v)
```

---

drawDisruptionNucleolus

draw disruption nucleolus for 3 or 4 players

Description

drawDisruptionNucleolus draws the disruption nucleolus for 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawDisruptionNucleolus(
  v,
  holdOn = FALSE,
  colour = NA,
  label = TRUE,
  name = "Disruption Nucleolus"
)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"
label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Littlechild S.C. and Vaidya K.G. (1976) "The propensity to disrupt and the disruption nucleolus of a characteristic function game", Int. Journal of Game Theory 5(2), pp. 151–161

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v<-bankruptcyGameVector(n=3,d=c(100,200,300),E=200)
drawDisruptionNucleolus(v)
```

---

drawGatelyValue   *draw Gately point for 3 or 4 players*

Description

drawGatelyValue draws the Gately point for 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawGatelyValue(
  v,
  holdOn = FALSE,
  colour = NA,
  label = TRUE,
  name = "Gately Value"
)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"
label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Gately D. (1974) "Sharing the Gains from Regional Cooperation. A Game Theoretic Application to Planning Investment in Electric Power", International Economic Review 15(1), pp. 195–208

Staudacher J. and Anwander J. (2019) "Conditions for the uniqueness of the Gately point for cooperative games", arXiv preprint, arXiv:1901.01485, 10 pages.

Littlechild S.C. and Vaidya K.G. (1976) "The propensity to disrupt and the disruption nucleolus of a characteristic function game", Int. Journal of Game Theory 5(2), pp. 151–161

Narahari Y. (2015) *Game Theory and Mechanism Design*, World Scientific Publishing, pp. 455–456

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
drawGatelyValue(c(0,0,0,1,1,1,3.5))


#Example from original paper by Gately (1974):
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,1170,770,210,1530)
drawGatelyValue(v)
```

---

drawImputationset   *Draw imputation set for 3 or 4 players*

Description

drawImputationset draws the imputation set for 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawImputationset(v, label = TRUE)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
label	activates the labels for the figure

Value

None.

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>
Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 20

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, p. 674

Osborne M.J. and Rubinstein A. (1994) *A Course in Game Theory*, MIT Press, p. 278

Narahari Y. (2015) *Game Theory and Mechanism Design*, World Scientific Publishing, p. 407

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,1,2,3,4,5,6)
drawImputationset(v)
```

---

drawJohnstonIndex	*Draw Johnston index for 3 or 4 players*

Description

drawJohnstonIndex draws the Johnston index for 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawJohnstonIndex(
  v,
  holdOn = FALSE,
  colour = NA,
  label = TRUE,
  name = "Johnston index"
)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"
label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

References

Johnston R.J. (1978) "On the measurement of power: Some reactions to Laver", Environment and Planning A, pp. 907–914

Chakravarty S.R., Mitra M. and Sarkar P. (2015) *A Course on Cooperative Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, p. 124

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v <- c(0,0,0,1,1,0,1)
drawJohnstonIndex(v)
```

---

drawModiclus   *Draw modiclus for 3 or 4 players*

Description

drawModiclus draws the modiclus for 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawModiclus(v, holdOn = FALSE, colour = NA, label = TRUE, name = "Modiclus")
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"
label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 124–132

Sudhoelter P. (1997) "The Modified Nucleolus. Properties and Axiomatizations", Int. Journal of Game Theory 26(2), pp. 147–182

Sudhoelter P. (1996) "The Modified Nucleolus as Canonical Representation of Weighted Majority Games", Mathematics of Operations Research 21(3), pp. 734–756

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
drawModiclus(v)
```

---

drawNormalizedBanzhafIndex

draw normalized Banzhaf Index for 3 or 4 players

Description

drawNormalizedBanzhafIndex draws the Banzhaf Value for 3 or 4 players.
Drawing any kind of Banzhaf values only makes sense from our point of view for the normalized Banzhaf index for simple games, because only in this case will the Banzhaf index be efficient.

Usage

```
drawNormalizedBanzhafIndex(
  v,
  holdOn = FALSE,
  colour = NA,
  label = TRUE,
  name = "Normalized Banzhaf index"
)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"
label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peters H. (2015) *Game Theory: A Multi-Leveled Approach*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 367–370

Chakravarty S.R., Mitra M. and Sarkar P. (2015) *A Course on Cooperative Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 118–119

Bertini C. and Stach I. (2011) "Banzhaf voting power measure", Encyclopedia of Power, SAGE Publications, pp. 54–55

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v<-weightedVotingGameVector(n=3,w=c(50,30,20),q=c(67))
drawNormalizedBanzhafIndex(v)
```

---

drawNormalizedBanzhafValue

draw normalized Banzhaf value for 3 or 4 players

Description

drawNormalizedBanzhafValue draws the Banzhaf Value for 3 or 4 players.
Drawing any kind of Banzhaf values only makes sense from our point of view for the normalized Banzhaf value, because only in this case will the Banzhaf value be efficient.

Usage

```
drawNormalizedBanzhafValue(
  v,
  holdOn = FALSE,
  colour = NA,
  label = TRUE,
  name = "Normalized Banzhaf value"
)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"

label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Gambarelli G. (2011) "Banzhaf value", Encyclopedia of Power, SAGE Publications, pp. 53–54

Stach I. (2017) "Sub-Coalitional Approach to Values", In: Nguyen, N.T. and Kowalczyk, R. (Eds.): Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXVI, Springer, pp. 74–86

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
drawNormalizedBanzhafValue(c(0,0,0,1,2,3,6))


#Example from paper by Gambarelli (2011)
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,1,2,1,3)
drawNormalizedBanzhafValue(v)
```

---

drawNucleolus	*Draw nucleolus for 3 or 4 players*

Description

drawNucleolus draws the nucleolus for 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawNucleolus(v, holdOn = FALSE, colour = NA, label = TRUE, name = "Nucleolus")
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"

label   activates the labels for the figure

name   set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

References

Schmeidler D. (1969) "The nucleolus of a characteristic function game", SIAM Journal on applied mathematics 17(6), pp. 1163–1170

Kohlberg E. (1971) "On the nucleolus of a characteristic function game", SIAM Journal on applied mathematics 20(1), pp. 62–66

Kopelowitz A. (1967) "Computation of the kernels of simple games and the nucleolus of n-person games", Technical Report, Department of Mathematics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 45 pages.

Megiddo N. (1974) "On the nonmonotonicity of the bargaining set, the kernel and the nucleolus of a game", SIAM Journal on applied mathematics 27(2), pp. 355–358

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 82–86

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,1,1,0,3)
drawNucleolus(v)


#Visualization for estate division problem from Babylonian Talmud with E=300,
#see e.g. seminal paper by Aumann & Maschler from 1985 on
#'Game Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud'
library(CoopGame)
v<-bankruptcyGameVector(n=3,d=c(100,200,300),E=300)
drawNucleolus(v)
```

---

drawPerCapitaNucleolus

Draw per capita nucleolus for 3 or 4 players

Description

drawPerCapitaNucleolus draws the per capita nucleolus for 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawPerCapitaNucleolus(
  v,
  holdOn = FALSE,
  colour = NA,
  label = TRUE,
  name = "Per Capita Nucleolus"
)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"
label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Young H.P. (1985) "Monotonic Solutions of cooperative games", Int. Journal of Game Theory 14(2), pp. 65–72

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,1,1,0,3)
drawPerCapitaNucleolus(v)


#Example from YOUNG 1985, p. 68
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,0,9,10,12)
drawPerCapitaNucleolus(v)
```

---

drawPrenucleolus *Draw prenucleolus for 3 or 4 players*

Description

drawPrenucleolus draws the prenucleolus for 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawPrenucleolus(
  v,
  holdOn = FALSE,
  colour = NA,
  label = TRUE,
  name = "Prenucleolus"
)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"
label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 107–132

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,1,1,0,3)
drawPrenucleolus(v)


#Visualization for estate division problem from Babylonian Talmud with E=200,
```

```
#see e.g. seminal paper by Aumann & Maschler from 1985 on
#'Game Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud'
library(CoopGame)
v<-bankruptcyGameVector(n=3,d=c(100,200,300),E=200)
drawPrenucleolus(v)
```

---

drawProportionalNucleolus

Draw proportional nucleolus for 3 or 4 players

Description

drawProportionalNucleolus draws the proportional nucleolus for 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawProportionalNucleolus(
  v,
  holdOn = FALSE,
  colour = NA,
  label = TRUE,
  name = "Proportional Nucleolus"
)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"
label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Young H. P., Okada N. and Hashimoto, T. (1982) "Cost allocation in water resources development", Water resources research 18(3), pp. 463–475

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v<-c(0,0,0,48,60,72,140)
drawProportionalNucleolus(v)
```

---

drawPublicGoodIndex   *Draw Public Good index for 3 or 4 players*

Description

drawPublicGoodIndex draws the Public Good Index of a simple game for 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawPublicGoodIndex(
  v,
  holdOn = FALSE,
  colour = NA,
  label = TRUE,
  name = "Public Good Index"
)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"
label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Holler M.J. and Packel E.W. (1983) "Power, luck and the right index", Zeitschrift fuer Nationaloekonomie 43(1), pp. 21–29

Holler M. (2011) "Public Goods index", Encyclopedia of Power, SAGE Publications, pp. 541–542

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,1,1,0,1)
drawPublicGoodIndex(v)
```

---

drawPublicGoodValue *Draw Public Good value for 3 or 4 players*

Description

drawPublicGoodValue draws the (normalized) Public Good value for 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawPublicGoodValue(
  v,
  holdOn = FALSE,
  colour = NA,
  label = TRUE,
  name = "Normalized Public Good Value"
)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"
label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Holler M.J. and Li X. (1995) "From public good index to public value. An axiomatic approach and generalization", Control and Cybernetics 24, pp. 257 – 270

Bertini C. and Stach I. (2015) "On Public Values and Power Indices", Decision Making in Manufacturing and Services 9(1), pp. 9 – 25

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,1,1,0,1)
drawPublicGoodValue(v)
```

---

drawPublicHelpChiIndex

Draw Public Help index Chi for 3 or 4 players

Description

drawPublicHelpChiIndex draws the Public Help index Chi for a simple game with 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawPublicHelpChiIndex(
  v,
  holdOn = FALSE,
  colour = NA,
  label = TRUE,
  name = "Public Help Chi Index"
)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"
label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Bertini C. and Stach I. (2015) "On Public Values and Power Indices", Decision Making in Manufacturing and Services 9(1), pp. 9–25

Stach I. (2016) "Power Measures and Public Goods", In: Nguyen, N.T. and Kowalczyk, R. (Eds.): Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXIII, Springer, pp. 99–110

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,1,1,0,1)
drawPublicHelpChiIndex(v)
```

---

drawPublicHelpChiValue

Draw Public Help value Chi for 3 or 4 players

Description

drawPublicHelpChiValue draws the (normalized) Public Help value Chi for 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawPublicHelpChiValue(
  v,
  holdOn = FALSE,
  colour = NA,
  label = TRUE,
  name = "Normalized Public Help Value Chi"
)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"
label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Bertini C. and Stach I. (2015) "On Public Values and Power Indices", Decision Making in Manufacturing and Services 9(1), pp. 9–25

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,2,2,0,3)
drawPublicHelpChiValue(v)
```

---

drawPublicHelpIndex   *Draw Public Help index Theta for 3 or 4 players*

Description

drawPublicHelpIndex draws the Public Help index Theta for a simple game with 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawPublicHelpIndex(
  v,
  holdOn = FALSE,
  colour = NA,
  label = TRUE,
  name = "Public Help Index"
)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"
label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Bertini C., Gambarelli G. and Stach I. (2008) "A public help index", In: Braham, M. and Steffen, F. (Eds): Power, freedom, and voting: Essays in Honour of Manfred J. Holler, pp. 83–98

Bertini C. and Stach I. (2015) "On Public Values and Power Indices", Decision Making in Manufacturing and Services 9(1), pp. 9–25

Stach I. (2016) "Power Measures and Public Goods", In: Nguyen, N.T. and Kowalczyk, R. (Eds.): Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXIII, Springer, pp. 99–110

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,1,1,0,1)
drawPublicHelpIndex(v)
```

---

drawPublicHelpValue   *Draw Public Help value Theta for 3 or 4 players*

Description

drawPublicHelpValue draws the (normalized) Public Help value Theta for 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawPublicHelpValue(
  v,
  holdOn = FALSE,
  colour = NA,
  label = TRUE,
  name = "Normalized Public Help Value"
)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"
label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Bertini C. and Stach I. (2015) "On Public Values and Power Indices", Decision Making in Manu-
facturing and Services 9(1), pp. 9–25

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,1,1,0,1)
drawPublicHelpValue(v)
```

---

drawReasonableSet   *Draw reasonable set for 3 or 4 players*

Description

drawReasonableSet draws the reasonable set for 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawReasonableSet(
  v,
  holdOn = FALSE,
  colour = NA,
  label = FALSE,
  name = "Reasonable Set"
)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"
label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Milnor J.W. (1953) *Reasonable Outcomes for N-person Games*, Rand Corporation, Research Memorandum RM 916.

Branzei R., Dimitrov D. and Tijs S. (2006) *Models in cooperative game theory*, Springer, p. 21

Chakravarty S.R., Mitra M. and Sarkar P. (2015) *A Course on Cooperative Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 43–44

Gerard-Varet L.A. and Zamir S. (1987) "Remarks on the reasonable set of outcomes in a general coalition function form game", Int. Journal of Game Theory 16(2), pp. 123–143

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v <- c(0,0,0,3,3,3,6)
drawReasonableSet(v)
```

---

drawShapleyShubikIndex

Draw Shapley-Shubik index for 3 or 4 players

Description

drawShapleyShubik draws the Shapley-Shubik index simple game with 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawShapleyShubikIndex(
  v,
  holdOn = FALSE,
  colour = NA,
  label = TRUE,
  name = "Shapley-Shubik index"
)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"
label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Shapley L.S. and Shubik M. (1954) "A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system". American political science review 48(3), pp. 787–792

Shapley L.S. (1953) "A value for n-person games". In: Kuhn, H., Tucker, A.W. (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Princeton University Press, pp. 307–317

Peters H. (2015) *Game Theory: A Multi-Leveled Approach*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 156–159

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 748–781

Stach I. (2011) "Shapley-Shubik index", Encyclopedia of Power, SAGE Publications, pp. 603–606

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,1,1,0,1)
drawShapleyShubikIndex(v)
```

---

drawShapleyValue   *Draw Shapley value for 3 or 4 players*

Description

drawShapleyValue draws the Shapley value for 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawShapleyValue(
  v,
  holdOn = FALSE,
  colour = NA,
  label = TRUE,
  name = "Shapley value"
)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"
label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Alexandra Tiukkel

References

Shapley L.S. (1953) "A value for n-person games". In: Kuhn, H., Tucker, A.W. (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Princeton University Press, pp. 307–317

Aumann R.J. (2010) "Some non-superadditive games, and their Shapley values, in the Talmud", Int. Journal of Game Theory 39(1), pp. 3–10

Peters H. (2015) *Game Theory: A Multi-Leveled Approach*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 156–159

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 748–781

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,1,1,0,1)
drawShapleyValue(v)
```

```
drawSimplifiedModiclus
```
Draw simplified modiclus for 3 or 4 players

Description

drawSimplifiedModiclus draws the simplified modiclus for 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawSimplifiedModiclus(
  v,
  holdOn = FALSE,
  colour = NA,
  label = TRUE,
  name = "Simplified Modiclus"
)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"
label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Tarashnina S. (2011) "The simplified modified nucleolus of a cooperative TU-game", TOP 19(1), pp. 150–166

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1)
drawSimplifiedModiclus(v)
```

---

drawTauValue   *Draw tau-value for 3 or 4 players*

Description

drawTauValue draws the tau-value for 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawTauValue(v, holdOn = FALSE, colour = NA, label = TRUE, name = "Tau value")
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"
label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Branzei R., Dimitrov D. and Tijs S. (2006) *Models in cooperative game theory*, Springer, p. 32

Tijs S. (1981) "Bounds for the core of a game and the t-value", In: Moeschlin, O. and Pallaschke, D. (Eds.): Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, North-Holland, pp. 123–132

Stach I. (2011) "Tijs value", Encyclopedia of Power, SAGE Publications, pp. 667–670

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v <-c(1,2,3,60,60,60,142)
drawTauValue(v,colour="green")
```

---

drawWeberset	*Draw Weber Set for 3 or 4 players*

Description

drawWeberset draws the Weber Set for 3 or 4 players.

Usage

```
drawWeberset(v, holdOn = FALSE, colour = NA, label = FALSE, name = "Weber Set")
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
holdOn	draws in a existing plot
colour	draws the geometric object (i.e. point or convex polyhedron) with this colour, all colour names can be seen with "colors()"
label	activates the labels for the figure
name	set a name for the label

Value

None.

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Weber R.J. (1988) "Probabilistic values for games". In: Roth A.E. (Ed.), The Shapley Value. Essays in in honor of Lloyd S. Shapley, Cambridge University Press, pp. 101–119

Peters H. (2015) *Game Theory: A Multi-Leveled Approach*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 327–329

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v = c(0,1,2,3,4,5,6)
drawWeberset(v, colour ="yellow")
```

---

equalPropensityToDisrupt

Compute equal propensity to disrupt

Description

equalPropensityToDisrupt calculates the equal propensity to disrupt for a TU game with n players and a specified coalition size k. See the original paper by Littlechild & Vaidya (1976) for the formula with general k and the paper by Staudacher & Anwander (2019) for the specific expression for k=1 and interpretations of the equal propensity to disrupt.

Usage

```
equalPropensityToDisrupt(v, k = 1)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
k	is the fixed coalition size to be considered when calculating the equal propensity to disrupt

Value

the value for the equal propensity to disrupt

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Littlechild S.C. and Vaidya K.G. (1976) "The propensity to disrupt and the disruption nucleolus of a characteristic function game", Int. Journal of Game Theory 5(2), pp. 151–161

Staudacher J. and Anwander J. (2019) "Conditions for the uniqueness of the Gately point for cooperative games", arXiv preprint, arXiv:1901.01485, 10 pages.

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,4,0,3,6)
equalPropensityToDisrupt(v, k=1)
```

---

gatelyValue   *Compute Gately point*

Description

gatelyValue calculates the Gately point for a given TU game

Usage

```
gatelyValue(v)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Value

Gately point of the TU game or NULL in case the Gately point is not defined

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher `<jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>`

References

Gately D. (1974) "Sharing the Gains from Regional Cooperation. A Game Theoretic Application to Planning Investment in Electric Power", International Economic Review 15(1), pp. 195–208

Staudacher J. and Anwander J. (2019) "Conditions for the uniqueness of the Gately point for cooperative games", arXiv preprint, arXiv:1901.01485, 10 pages.

Littlechild S.C. and Vaidya K.G. (1976) "The propensity to disrupt and the disruption nucleolus of a characteristic function game", Int. Journal of Game Theory 5(2), pp. 151–161

Narahari Y. (2015) *Game Theory and Mechanism Design*, World Scientific Publishing, pp. 455–456

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
gatelyValue(c(0,0,0,1,1,1,3.5))


library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,4,0,3,6)
gatelyValue(v)

#Output (18/11,36/11,12/11):
#1.636364 3.272727 1.090909

#Example from original paper by Gately (1974)
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,1170,770,210,1530)
gatelyValue(v)

#Output:
#827.7049 476.5574 225.7377
```

---

getCriticalCoalitionsOfPlayer
                                    Compute critical coalitions of a player for simple games

---

Description

getCriticalCoalitionsOfPlayer identifies all coalitions for one player in which that player is critical (within a simple game). These coalitions are characterized by the circumstance that without this player the other players generate no value (then also called a losing coalition) - therefore this player is also described as a critical player.

Usage

```
getCriticalCoalitionsOfPlayer(player, v)
```

Arguments

player   represents the observed player

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                TU game with n players

Value

A data frame containing all minimal winning coalitions for one special player

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Deegan J. and Packel E.W. (1978) "A new index of power for simple n-person games", Int. Journal of Game Theory 7(2), pp. 151–161

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
getCriticalCoalitionsOfPlayer(2,v=c(0,0,0,0,0,1,1))


library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,1,0,1,0,1,1)

#Get coalitions where player 2 is critical:
getCriticalCoalitionsOfPlayer(2,v)
#Output are all coalitions where player 2 is involved.
#Observe that player 2 is dictator in this game.
#
#     V1 V2 V3 cVal bmRow
# 2  0  1  0   1     2
# 4  1  1  0   1     4
# 6  0  1  1   1     6
# 7  1  1  1   1     7
```

---

getDualGameVector   *Compute dual game vector*

Description

Computes the dual game for a given TU game with n players specified by a game vector.

Usage

```
getDualGameVector(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                          TU game with n players

Value

Numeric vector of length (2^n)-1 representing the dual game.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

References

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 125

Branzei R., Dimitrov D. and Tijs S. (2006) *Models in cooperative game theory*, Springer, p. 7

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, p. 737

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v<-unanimityGameVector(4,c(1,2))
getDualGameVector(v)
```

getEmptyParamCheckResult

getEmptyParamCheckResult for generating stucture according to parameter check results

Description

Returns a defined data structure which is intended to store an error code and a message after the check of function parameters was executed. In case parameter check was successfull the error code has the value '0' and the message is 'NULL'.

Usage

```
getEmptyParamCheckResult()
```

Value

list with 2 elements named errCode which contains an integer representing the error code ('0' if no error) and errMessage for the error message ('NULL' if no error)

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

See Also

Other ParameterChecks_CoopGame: stopOnInconsistentEstateAndClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidAllocation(), stopOnInvalidBoolean(), stopOnInvalidClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidCoalitionS(), stopOnInvalidDictator() stopOnInvalidEstate(), stopOnInvalidGameVector(), stopOnInvalidGrandCoalitionN(), stopOnInvalidIndex(), stopOnInvalidLeftRightGloveGame(), stopOnInvalidNChooseB(), stopOnInvalidNumberOfPlayers(), stopOnInvalidNumber(), stopOnInvalidQuota(), stopOnInvalidVetoPlayer(), stopOnInvalidWeightVector(), stopOnParamCheckError()

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)

initParamCheck_example=function(numberOfPlayers){
 paramCheckResult=getEmptyParamCheckResult()
 if(numberOfPlayers!=3){
   paramCheckResult$errMessage="The number of players is not 3 as expected"
   paramCheckResult$errCode=1
 }
 return(paramCheckResult)
}

initParamCheck_example(3)
#Output:
#$errCode
```

```
#[1] 0
#$errMessage
#NULL
```

getExcessCoefficients   *Compute excess coefficients*

Description

getExcessCoefficients computes the excess coefficients for a specified TU game and an allocation x

Usage

```
getExcessCoefficients(v, x)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
x	numeric vector containing allocations for each player

Value

numeric vector containing the excess coefficients for every coalition

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 58

Driessen T. (1998) *Cooperative Games, Solutions and Applications*, Springer, p. 12

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
getExcessCoefficients(c(0,0,0,60,48,30,72), c(24,24,24))
```

---

getGainingCoalitions   *Compute gaining coalitions of a TU game*

Description

The function getGainingCoalitions identifies all gaining coalitions. Coalition S is a gaining coalition if there holds: $v(S) > 0$

Usage

```
getGainingCoalitions(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Value

A data frame containing all gaining coalitions.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Bertini C. and Stach I. (2015) "On Public Values and Power Indices", Decision Making in Manufacturing and Services 9(1), pp. 9–25

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
getGainingCoalitions(v=c(0,0,0,2,0,2,3))


library(CoopGame)
v <- c(1,2,3,4,0,0,11)
getGainingCoalitions(v)
# Output:
#     V1 V2 V3 cVal
# 1  1  0  0    1
# 2  0  1  0    2
# 3  0  0  1    3
# 4  1  1  0    4
# 7  1  1  1   11
```

---

getGapFunctionCoefficients

Compute gap function coefficients

Description

getGapFunctionCoefficients computes the gap function coefficients for a specified TU game

Usage

```
getGapFunctionCoefficients(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
              TU game with n players

Value

numeric vector containing the gap function coefficients for every coalition

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Driessen T. (1998) *Cooperative Games, Solutions and Applications*, Springer, p. 57

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
getGapFunctionCoefficients(c(0,0,0,60,48,30,72))
```

---

getkCover   *Compute k-cover of game*

Description

getkCover returns the k-cover for a given TU game according to the formula on p. 173 in the book
by Driessen. Note that the k-cover does not exist if condition (7.2) on p. 173 in the book by Driessen
is not satisfied.

Usage

```
getkCover(v, k)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
k	An integer specifying k in the k-cover

Value

numeric vector containing the k-cover of the given game if the k-cover exists, NULL otherwise

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Driessen T. (1998) *Cooperative Games, Solutions and Applications*, Springer, p. 173

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
getkCover(c(0,0,0,9,9,12,18),k=1)


library(CoopGame)
#Example from textbook by Driessen, p. 175, with alpha = 0.6 and k = 2
alpha = 0.6
getkCover(c(0,0,0,alpha,alpha,0,1), k=2)
#[1] 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.0 1.0
```

---

getMarginalContributions
Compute marginal contributions

Description

Calculates the marginal contributions for all permutations of the players

Usage

```
getMarginalContributions(v)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Value

a list with given game vector, a matrix of combinations used and a matrix with the marginal contributions

Author(s)

Alexandra Tiukkel

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peters H. (2015) *Game Theory: A Multi-Leveled Approach*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 156–159

Branzei R., Dimitrov D. and Tijs S. (2006) *Models in cooperative game theory*, Springer, p. 6

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,1,1,0,1)
getMarginalContributions(v)
```

---

getMinimalRights   *Compute minimal rights vector*

Description

Calculates the minimal rights vector.

Usage

```
getMinimalRights(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                    TU game with n players

Value

Vector of minimal rights of each player

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Michael Maerz

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Branzei R., Dimitrov D. and Tijs S. (2006) *Models in cooperative game theory*, Springer, pp. 20–21

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
getMinimalRights(c(0,0,0,1,0,1,1))


library(CoopGame)
v1 <- c(0,0,0,60,60,60,72)
getMinimalRights(v1)
#[1] 48 48 48

library(CoopGame)
v2 <- c(2,4,5,18,14,9,24)
getMinimalRights(v2)
#[1] 8 4 5
```

---

getMinimumWinningCoalitions

Compute minimal winning coalitions in a simple game

Description

The function getMinimumWinningCoalitions identifies all minimal winning coalitions of a specified simple game. These coalitions are characterized by the circumstance that if any player breaks away from them, then the coalition generates no value (then also called a losing coalition) - all players in the coalition can therefore be described as critical players.

Usage

```
getMinimumWinningCoalitions(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Value

A data frame containing all minimum winning coalitions for a simple game.

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Deegan J. and Packel E.W. (1978) "A new index of power for simple n-person games", Int. Journal of Game Theory 7(2), pp. 151–161

Peters H. (2015) *Game Theory: A Multi-Leveled Approach*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 295

Bertini C. (2011) "Minimal winning coalition", Encyclopedia of Power, SAGE Publications, pp. 422–423

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
getMinimumWinningCoalitions(v=c(0,0,0,0,0,0,1))


library(CoopGame)
v=weightedVotingGameVector(n=3,w=c(1,2,3),q=5)
getMinimumWinningCoalitions(v)
# Output:
#   V1 V2 V3 cVal
# 6  0  1  1    1
# => the coalition containing player 2 and 3 is a minimal winning coalition
```

---

getNumberOfPlayers   *Get number of players*

Description

Gets the number of players from a game vector

Usage

```
getNumberOfPlayers(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                    TU game with n players

Value

Number of players in the game (specified by game vector v)

Author(s)

Michael Maerz

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
maschlerGame=c(0,0,0,60,60,60,72)
getNumberOfPlayers(maschlerGame)
```

---

getPerCapitaExcessCoefficients

Compute per capita excess coefficients

Description

getPerCapitaExcessCoefficients computes the per capita excess coefficients for a specified TU game and an allocation x

Usage

```
getPerCapitaExcessCoefficients(v, x)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length $2^n - 1$ representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
x	numeric vector containing allocations for each player

Value

numeric vector containing the per capita excess coefficients for every coalition

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
getPerCapitaExcessCoefficients(c(0,0,0,60,48,30,72), c(24,24,24))
```

getPlayersFromBitVector

Extract players from bit vector

Description

getPlayersFromBitVector determines players involved in a coalition from a binary vector.

Usage

```
getPlayersFromBitVector(bitVector)
```

Arguments

bitVector   represents the binary vector

Value

playerVector contains the numbers of the players involved in the coalition

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
myBitVector <-c(1,0,1,0)
(players<-getPlayersFromBitVector(myBitVector))
```

getPlayersFromBMRow   *Extract players from bit matrix row*

Description

getPlayersFromBMRow determines players involved in a coalition from the row of a bit matrix

Usage

```
getPlayersFromBMRow(bmRow)
```

Arguments

bmRow   represents the bit matrix row

Value

playerVector contains involved players (e.g. c(1,3), see example below for bitIndex=5 and n=3)

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
bm=createBitMatrix(n=3,A=c(0,0,0,1,1,1,2))
getPlayersFromBMRow(bmRow=bm[4,])


library(CoopGame)
bm=createBitMatrix(n=3,A=c(1:7))
#Corresponding bit matrix:
#          cVal
#[1,] 1 0 0    1
#[2,] 0 1 0    2
#[3,] 0 0 1    3
#[4,] 1 1 0    4
#[5,] 1 0 1    5 <=Specified bit index
#[6,] 0 1 1    6
#[7,] 1 1 1    7

#Determine players from bit matrix row by index 5
players=getPlayersFromBMRow(bmRow=bm[5,])
#Result:
players
#[1] 1 3
```

---

getRealGainingCoalitions

Compute real gaining coalitions of game

Description

The function getRealGainingCoalitions identifies all real gaining coalitions. Coalition S is a real gaining coalition if for any true subset T of S there holds: v(S) > v(T)

Usage

```
getRealGainingCoalitions(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                         TU game with n players

Value

A data frame containing all real gaining coalitions.

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Holler M.J. and Li X. (1995) "From public good index to public value. An axiomatic approach and
generalization", Control and Cybernetics 24, pp. 257–270

Bertini C. and Stach I. (2015) "On Public Values and Power Indices", Decision Making in Manu-
facturing and Services 9(1), pp. 9–25

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
getRealGainingCoalitions(v=c(0,0,0,0,0,0,2))


library(CoopGame)
v <- c(1,2,3,4,0,0,0)
getRealGainingCoalitions(v)
# Output:
#     V1 V2 V3 cVal
# 1  1  0  0    1
# 2  0  1  0    2
# 3  0  0  1    3
# 4  1  1  0    4
```

---

getUnanimityCoefficients

                              Compute unanimity coefficients of game

---

Description

getUnanimityCoefficients calculates to unanimity coefficients of a specified TU game. Note that
the unanimity coefficients are also frequently referred to as Harsanyi dividends in the literature.

Usage

```
getUnanimityCoefficients(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                         TU game with n players

Value

numeric vector containing the unanimity coefficients

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 153

Gilles R. P. (2015) *The Cooperative Game Theory of Networks and Hierarchies*, Springer, pp. 15–17

Shapley L.S. (1953) "A value for n-person games". In: Kuhn, H., Tucker, A.W. (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Princeton University Press, pp. 307–317

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
getUnanimityCoefficients(c(0,0,0,60,48,30,72))
```

---

getUtopiaPayoff   *Compute utopia payoff vector of game*

Description

getUtopiaPayoff calculates the utopia payoff vector for each player in a TU game.
The utopia payoff of player i is the marginal contribution of player i to the grand coalition.

Usage

```
getUtopiaPayoff(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                         TU game with n players

Value

utopia payoffs for each player

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Michael Maerz

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Branzei R., Dimitrov D. and Tijs S. (2006) *Models in cooperative game theory*, Springer, p. 31

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
maschlerGame <- c(0,0,0,60,60,60,72)
getUtopiaPayoff(maschlerGame)
```

---

getVectorOfPropensitiesToDisrupt

Compute vector of propensities to disrupt

Description

getVectorOfPropensitiesToDisrupt computes a vector of propensities to disrupt for game vector v
and an allocation x

Usage

```
getVectorOfPropensitiesToDisrupt(v, x)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
x	numeric vector containing allocations for each player

Value

a numerical vector of propensities to disrupt at a given allocation x

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Littlechild S.C. and Vaidya K.G. (1976) "The propensity to disrupt and the disruption nucleolus of a characteristic function game", Int. Journal of Game Theory 5(2), pp. 151–161

Staudacher J. and Anwander J. (2019) "Conditions for the uniqueness of the Gately point for cooperative games", arXiv preprint, arXiv:1901.01485, 10 pages.

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,4,0,3,6)
x=c(2,3,1)
getVectorOfPropensitiesToDisrupt(v,x)
```

---

getWinningCoalitions   *Compute winning coalitions in a simple game*

Description

The function getWinningCoalitions identifies all winning coalitions of a specified simple game.

Usage

```
getWinningCoalitions(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                TU game with n players

Value

A data frame containing all winning coalitions for a simple game.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Bertini C., Gambarelli G. and Stach I. (2008) "A public help index", In: Braham, M. and Steffen, F. (Eds): Power, freedom, and voting: Essays in Honour of Manfred J. Holler, pp. 83–98

Bertini C. and Stach I. (2015) "On Public Values and Power Indices", Decision Making in Manufacturing and Services 9(1), pp. 9–25

Stach I. (2016) "Power Measures and Public Goods", In: Nguyen, N.T. and Kowalczyk, R. (Eds.): Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXIII, Springer, pp. 99–110

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
getWinningCoalitions(v=c(0,0,0,1,0,1,1))


library(CoopGame)
v=weightedVotingGameVector(n=3,w=c(1,2,3),q=5)
getWinningCoalitions(v)
# Output:
#   V1 V2 V3 cVal
# 6  0  1  1    1
# 7  1  1  1    1
# => the coalition containing player 2 and 3 and
#    the grand coalition are winning coalitions
```

getZeroNormalizedGameVector

Compute 0-normalized game vector

Description

Computes the zero-normalized game for a given game specified by a game vector.

Usage

```
getZeroNormalizedGameVector(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                      TU game with n players

Value

Numeric vector of length (2^n)-1 representing the zero-normalized game.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

References

Branzei R., Dimitrov D. and Tijs S. (2006) *Models in cooperative game theory*, Springer, p. 9

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 11

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v<-c(1:7)
getZeroNormalizedGameVector(v)
```

---

getZeroOneNormalizedGameVector

Compute 0-1-normalized game vector

Description

Computes the zero-one-normalized game for a given game specified by a game vector.

Usage

```
getZeroOneNormalizedGameVector(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                TU game with n players

Value

Numeric vector of length (2^n)-1 representing the zero-one-normalized game.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

References

Gilles R. P. (2015) *The Cooperative Game Theory of Networks and Hierarchies*, Springer, p. 18

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, p. 670

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v<-c(1:7)
getZeroOneNormalizedGameVector(v)
```

gloveGame	*Construct a glove game*

Description

Create a list containing all information about a specified glove game:
We have a set of players L with left-hand gloves and a set of players R with right-hand gloves. The worth of a coalition S equals the number of pairs of gloves the members of S can make. Note that the sets L and R have to be disjoint.

Usage

```
gloveGame(n, L, R)
```

Arguments

n	represents the number of players
L	numeric vector of players owning one left-hand glove each
R	numeric vector of players owning one right-hand glove each

Value

A list with four elements representing the glove game (n, L, R, Game vector v)

Related Functions

gloveGameValue, gloveGameVector

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peters H. (2015) *Game Theory: A Multi-Leveled Approach*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 155–156

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
gloveGame(n=3,L=c(1,2), R=c(3))


#Example with four players:
#players 1, 2 and 4 hold a left-hand glove each,
#player 3 holds a right-hand glove.
library(CoopGame)
(vv<-gloveGame(n=4,L=c(1,2,4), R=c(3)))
#$n
```

```
#[1] 3

#$L
#[1] 1 2 4
#
#$R
#[1] 3
#
#$v
#[1] 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
```

---

gloveGameValue   *Compute value of a coalition for a glove game*

Description

Coalition value for a specified glove game:
For further information see gloveGame

Usage

```
gloveGameValue(S, L, R)
```

Arguments

S	numeric vector with coalition of players
L	numeric vector of players owning one left-hand glove each
R	numeric vector of players owning one right-hand glove each

Value

Number of matched pairs of gloves for given coalition S

Author(s)

Alexandra Tiukkel

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peters H. (2015) *Game Theory: A Multi-Leveled Approach*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 155–156

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
gloveGameValue(S=c(1,2), L=c(1,2), R=c(3))
```

---

gloveGameVector   *Compute game vector for glove game*

Description

Game vector for glove game:
For further information see gloveGame

Usage

```
gloveGameVector(n, L, R)
```

Arguments

n	represents the number of players
L	numeric vector of players owning one left-hand glove each
R	numeric vector of players owning one right-hand glove each

Value

Game vector of the specified glove game

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peters H. (2015) *Game Theory: A Multi-Leveled Approach*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 155–156

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
gloveGameVector(3, L=c(1,2), R=c(3))
```

imputationsetVertices   *Compute vertices of imputation set*

Description

imputationsetVertices calculates the imputation set vertices for given game vector.

Usage

```
imputationsetVertices(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                TU game with n players

Value

rows of the matrix are the vertices of the imputation set

Author(s)

Michael Maerz

Franz Mueller

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 20

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, p. 674

Osborne M.J. and Rubinstein A. (1994) *A Course in Game Theory*, MIT Press, p. 278

Narahari Y. (2015) *Game Theory and Mechanism Design*, World Scientific Publishing, p. 407

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
imputationsetVertices(c(0,0,0,1,1,1,2))


library(CoopGame)
v = c(2, 4, 5, 18, 24, 9, 24)

imputationsetVertices(v)

#      [,1] [,2] [,3]
#[1,]   15    4    5
#[2,]    2   17    5
```

```
#[3,]    2    4    18
```

---

is1ConvexGame   *Check if game is 1-Convex*

Description

is1ConvexGame checks if a TU game is 1-convex. A TU game is 1-convex if and only if the following condition holds true: Let S be a nonempty coalition. Whenever all players outside S receive their payoffs according to the utopia payoff of the game, then the remaining part of the total savings is at least v(S).

Usage

```
is1ConvexGame(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Value

TRUE if the game is 1-convex, else FALSE

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Driessen T. (1998) *Cooperative Games, Solutions and Applications*, Springer, p. 73

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
is1ConvexGame(c(0,0,0,9,9,12,18))


#1-convex game (taken from book by T. Driessen, p. 75)
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,9,9,15,18)
is1ConvexGame(v)

#Example of a game which is not 1-convex
library(CoopGame)
v=c(1:7)
```

```
is1ConvexGame(v)
```

---

isAdditiveGame   *Check if game is additive*

Description

Checks if a TU game with n players is additive.

In an additive game for any two disjoint coalitions S and T the value of the union of S and T equals the sum of the values of S and T. In other words, additive games are constant-sum and the imputation set of an additive game consists of exactly one point.

Usage

```
isAdditiveGame(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                       TU game with n players

Value

TRUE if the game is additive, else FALSE

Author(s)

Alexandra Tiukkel

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 11

Peters H. (2015) *Game Theory: A Multi-Leveled Approach*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 292

Osborne M.J. and Rubinstein A. (1994) *A Course in Game Theory*, MIT Press, p. 261

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
isAdditiveGame(c(1,1,1,2,2,2,3))


#The following game is not additive
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,40,50,20,100)
isAdditiveGame(v)
```

```
#The following game is additive
library(CoopGame)
v=c(1,1,1,1, 2,2,2,2,2,2, 3,3,3,3, 4)
isAdditiveGame(v)
```

---

isBalancedGame   *Check if game is balanced*

Description

Checks if a game is balanced. A game is balanced if the core is a nonempty set.

Usage

```
isBalancedGame(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                     TU game with n players

Value

TRUE if the game is balanced, else FALSE

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Bondareva O.N. (1963) "Some applications of linear programming methods to the theory of cooperative games". Problemy kibernetiki 10, pp. 119–139

Shapley L.S. (1967) "On Balanced Sets and Cores". Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 14, pp. 453–460

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 27–32

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 691–702

Slikker M. and van den Nouweland A. (2001) *Social and Economic Networks in Cooperative Game Theory*, Springer, pp. 6–7

Osborne M.J. and Rubinstein A. (1994) *A Course in Game Theory*, MIT Press, pp. 262–263

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,40,50,20,100)
isBalancedGame(v)


#Example of an unbalanced game with 3 players
library(CoopGame)
v=c(1,1,1,2,3,4,3)
isBalancedGame(v)

#Example of an unbalanced game with 4 players
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,3,3,3,3,3,4)
isBalancedGame(v)

#Example of a balanced game with 4 players
library(CoopGame)
v= c(0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,2,2,2,2,2,4)
isBalancedGame(v)
```

---

isConstantSumGame   *Check if game is constant-sum*

Description

Checks if a TU game with n players is constant-sum.
In a constant-sum game for any coalition S the sums of the values of the coalition S and its complement equal the value of the grand coalition N.

Usage

```
isConstantSumGame(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                   TU game with n players

Value

TRUE if the game is constant-sum, else FALSE.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 11

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,2,2,2,2)
isConstantSumGame(v)


#Example of a game that is not constant-sum
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,40,30,130,100)
isConstantSumGame(v)

#Another example of a constant-sum game
library(CoopGame)
v=c(1,1,1,2, 2,2,2,2,2,2, 2,3,3,3, 4)
isConstantSumGame(v)
```

---

isConvexGame   *Check if game is convex*

Description

isConvexGame checks if a TU game is convex. A TU game is convex if and only if each player's marginal contribution to any coalition is monotone nondecreasing with respect to set-theoretic inclusion.

Usage

```
isConvexGame(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                   TU game with n players

Value

TRUE if the game is convex, else FALSE

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 10

Peters H. (2015) *Game Theory: A Multi-Leveled Approach*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 329

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 717–718

Osborne M.J. and Rubinstein A. (1994) *A Course in Game Theory*, MIT Press, pp. 260–261

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
isConvexGame(c(0,0,0,1,1,1,5))


#Example of a convex game with three players
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,1,2,1,4)
isConvexGame(v)

#Example of a nonconvex game
library(CoopGame)
v=c(1:7)
isConvexGame(v)
```

---

isDegenerateGame   *Check if game is degenerate*

Description

Checks if a TU game is degenerate. We call a game essential if the value of the grand coalition is greater than the sum of the values of the singleton coalitions. We call a game degenerate (or inessential), if

$$v(N) = \sum v(i)$$

.

Usage

```
isDegenerateGame(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Value

TRUE if the game is degenerate, else FALSE

Author(s)

Michael Maerz

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
isDegenerateGame(c(1,2,3,4,4,4,6))


#The following game, i.e. the Maschler game, is not degenerate
library(CoopGame)
v1 <- c(0,0,0,60,60,60,72)
isDegenerateGame(v1)

#The following game is also not degenerate
library(CoopGame)
v2 <- c(30,30,15,60,60,60,72)
isDegenerateGame(v2)

#The following game is degenerate
library(CoopGame)
v3 <- c(20,20,32,60,60,60,72)
isDegenerateGame(v3)
```

---

isEssentialGame   *Check if game is essential*

Description

Checks if a TU game with n players is essential. We call a game essential, if the value of the grand coalition is greater than the sum of the values of the singleton coalitions. A game is essential, if

$$v(N) > \sum v(i)$$

.
For an essential game the imputation set is nonempty and consists of more than one point.

Usage

```
isEssentialGame(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                     TU game with n players

Value

TRUE if the game is essential, else FALSE.

Author(s)

Michael Maerz

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Chakravarty S.R., Mitra M. and Sarkar P. (2015) *A Course on Cooperative Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, p. 23

Gilles R. P. (2015) *The Cooperative Game Theory of Networks and Hierarchies*, Springer, p. 18

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
isEssentialGame(c(1,2,3,4,4,4,7))


# Example of an essential game
library(CoopGame)
v1 <- c(0,0,0,60,60,60,72)
isEssentialGame(v1)

# Example of a game that is not essential
library(CoopGame)
v2 <- c(30,30,15,60,60,60,72)
isEssentialGame(v2)

# Example of a game that is not essential
library(CoopGame)
v3 <- c(20,20,32,60,60,60,72)
isEssentialGame(v3)
```

---

iskConvexGame   *Check if game is k-Convex*

Description

iskConvexGame checks if a TU game is k-convex. A TU game is k-convex if and only if its k-cover exists and is convex. See section 7.1 of the book by Driessen for more details

Usage

```
iskConvexGame(v, k)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length $2^n - 1$ representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
k	An integer specifying k

Value

TRUE if the game is k-convex, else FALSE

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Driessen T. (1998) *Cooperative Games, Solutions and Applications*, Springer, p. 171–178

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
iskConvexGame(v=c(0,0,0,9,9,12,18), k=1)


# Two examples motivated by the book by T. Driessen, p. 175:
#
# The following game is 2-convex
library(CoopGame)
alpha = 0.4
v=c(0,0,0,alpha,alpha,0,1)
iskConvexGame(v,2)

# The following game is not 2-convex
library(CoopGame)
alpha = 0.7
v=c(0,0,0,alpha,alpha,0,1)
iskConvexGame(v,2)
```

---

isMonotonicGame *Check if game is monotonic*

Description

Checks if a TU game with n players is monotonic.
For a monotonic game a coalition S can never obtain a larger value than another coalition T if S is contained in T.

Usage

```
isMonotonicGame(v)
```

Arguments

v Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Value

TRUE if the game is monotonic, else FALSE

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 12

Narahari Y. (2015) *Game Theory and Mechanism Design*, World Scientific Publishing, p. 408

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
isMonotonicGame(c(0,0,0,1,0,1,1))


#Example of a non-monotonic game
library(CoopGame)
v1=c(4,2,5,2,3,6,10)
isMonotonicGame(v1)

#Example of a monotonic game
library(CoopGame)
v2=c(2,5,7,10, 9, 13,20)
isMonotonicGame(v2)
```

---

isNonnegativeGame   *Check if game is nonnegative*

Description

isNonnegativeGame checks if a TU game is a nonnegative game. A TU game is a nonnegative game if the game vector does not contain any negative entries.

Usage

```
isNonnegativeGame(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                         TU game with n players

Value

TRUE if the game is nonnegative, else FALSE.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
isNonnegativeGame(c(0,0,0,0.5,0.1,0.4,1))


#Nonnegative game
library(CoopGame)
v1<-c(0,0,0,0,1,1,1)
isNonnegativeGame(v1)

#Example for game which is not nonnegative
library(CoopGame)
v2<-c(0,0,0,0,-1.1,1,2)
isNonnegativeGame(v2)
```

---

isQuasiBalancedGame *Check if game is quasi-balanced*

Description

Checks if a TU game is quasi-balanced.

A TU game is quasi-balanced if

a) the components of its minimal rights vector are less or equal than the components of its utopia payoff vector

and

b) the sum of the components of its minimal rights vector is less or equal the value of the grand coalition which in turn is less or equal than the sum of the components of its utopia payoff vector.

Note that any balanced game is also quasi-balanced, but not vice versa.

Note that the quasi-balanced games are those games with a non-empty core cover. Note also that quasi-balancedness is sometimes in the literature also referred to as compromise-admissibility.

Usage

```
isQuasiBalancedGame(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length $2^n - 1$ representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Value

TRUE if the game is quasi-balanced, else FALSE.

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Branzei R., Dimitrov D. and Tijs S. (2006) *Models in cooperative game theory*, Springer, p. 31

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
isQuasiBalancedGame(c(0,0,0,1,1,1,4))


#Example of a quasi-balanced game:
library(CoopGame)
v1=c(1,1,2,6,8,14,16)
isQuasiBalancedGame(v1)
```

```
#Example of a game which is not quasi-balanced:
library(CoopGame)
v2=c(1:7)
isQuasiBalancedGame(v2)
```

---

isSemiConvexGame   *Check if game is semiconvex*

Description

isSemiConvexGame checks if a TU game is semiconvex. A TU game is semiconvex if and only if
the following conditions hold true: The gap function of any single player i is minimal among the
gap function values of coalitions S containing player i. Also, the gap function itself is required to
be nonnegative.

Usage

```
isSemiConvexGame(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                   TU game with n players

Value

TRUE if the game is semiconvex, else FALSE.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Driessen T. and Tijs S. (1985) "The tau-value, the core and semiconvex games", Int. Journal of
Game Theory 14(4), pp. 229–247

Driessen T. (1998) *Cooperative Games, Solutions and Applications*, Springer, p. 76

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
isSemiConvexGame(c(0,0,0,1,1,1,4))


#Example of a semiconvex game
library(CoopGame)
```

```
v1<-c(3,4,5,9,10,11,18)
isSemiConvexGame(v1)

#Example of a game which not semiconvex
library(CoopGame)
v2=c(1:7)
isSemiConvexGame(v2)
```

---

isSimpleGame   *Check if game is simple*

Description

isSimpleGame checks if a TU game is a simple game. A TU game is a simple game in the sense of the book by Peleg and Sudhoelter (2007), p. 16, if and only if the game is monotonic and the values of all coalitions are either 0 or 1.

Usage

```
isSimpleGame(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                TU game with n players

Value

TRUE if the game is essential, else FALSE.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 16

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
isSimpleGame(c(0,0,0,1,0,1,1))


#Example of a simple game
library(CoopGame)
v1<-c(0,0,0,0,1,1,1)
```

```
isSimpleGame(v1)

#Example of a game which not simple
library(CoopGame)
v2<-c(0,0,0,0,1,1,2)
isSimpleGame(v2)

#Another example of a game which not simple
#according to our definition
library(CoopGame)
v3<-c(1,0,0,0,1,1,1)
isSimpleGame(v3)
```

---

isSuperadditiveGame   *Check if game is superadditive*

Description

Checks if a TU game with n players is superadditive.

In a superadditive game for any two disjoint coalitions S and T the value of the union of S and T is always greater or equal the sum of the values of S and T. In other words, the members of any two disjoint coalitions S and T will never be discouraged from collaborating.

Usage

```
isSuperadditiveGame(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                     TU game with n players

Value

TRUE if the game is superadditive, else FALSE.

Author(s)

Alexandra Tiukkel

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 10

Peters H. (2015) *Game Theory: A Multi-Leveled Approach*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 295

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, p. 671

Narahari Y. (2015) *Game Theory and Mechanism Design*, World Scientific Publishing, p. 408

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
isSuperadditiveGame(c(0,0,0,1,1,1,2))


#Example of a superadditive game
library(CoopGame)
v1=c(0,0,0,40,50,20,100)
isSuperadditiveGame(v1)

#Example of a game that is not superadditive
library(CoopGame)
v2=c(0,0,0,40,30,130,100)
isSuperadditiveGame(v2)

#Another example of a superadditive game
library(CoopGame)
v3=c(1,1,1,1, 2,2,2,2,2,2, 3,3,3,3, 4)
isSuperadditiveGame(v3)
```

---

isSymmetricGame *Check if game is symmetric*

Description

isSymmetricGame checks if a TU game is symmetric. A TU game is symmetric if and only if the values of all coalitions containing the same number of players are identical.

Usage

```
isSymmetricGame(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
           TU game with n players

Value

TRUE if the game is symmetric, else FALSE.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 12

Chakravarty S.R., Mitra M. and Sarkar P. (2015) *A Course on Cooperative Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, p. 26

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
isSymmetricGame(c(0,0,0,1,1,1,2))


#Example of a symmetric game
library(CoopGame)
v1<-c(3,3,3,10,10,10,17)
isSymmetricGame(v1)

#Example of a game which is not symmetric
library(CoopGame)
v2=c(1:7)
isSymmetricGame(v2)
```

---

isWeaklyConstantSumGame

Check if game is weakly constant-sum

Description

Checks if a TU game with n players is weakly constant-sum.
In a weakly constant-sum game for any singleton coalition the sums of the values of that singleton coalition and its complement equal the value of the grand coalition N.

Usage

```
isWeaklyConstantSumGame(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                  TU game with n players

Value

TRUE if the game is weakly constant-sum, else FALSE.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Staudacher J. and Anwander J. (2019) "Conditions for the uniqueness of the Gately point for cooperative games", arXiv preprint, arXiv:1901.01485, 10 pages.

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v1=c(0,0,0,2,2,2,2)
isWeaklyConstantSumGame(v1)


#Example of a game that is not weakly constant-sum
library(CoopGame)
v2=c(0,0,0,40,30,130,100)
isWeaklyConstantSumGame(v2)

#Another example of a weakly constant-sum game
library(CoopGame)
v3=c(1,1,1,2, 7,7,7,7,7,7, 2,3,3,3, 4)
isWeaklyConstantSumGame(v3)
```

---

isWeaklySuperadditiveGame

Check if game is weakly superadditive

Description

Checks if a TU game with n players is weakly superadditive.
Let S be a coalition and i a player not contained in S. Then the TU game is weakly superadditive if for any S and any i the value of the union of S and i is greater or equal the sum of the values of S and i.
Note that weak superadditivity is equivalent to zero-monotonicity.

Usage

```
isWeaklySuperadditiveGame(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                TU game with n players

Value

TRUE if the game is weakly superadditive, else FALSE.

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 10

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
isWeaklySuperadditiveGame(c(0,0,0,1,1,1,1))


#Example of a weakly superadditive game
library(CoopGame)
v1=c(1:15)
isWeaklySuperadditiveGame(v1)

#Example of a game which is not weakly superadditive
library(CoopGame)
v2=c(1:5,7,7)
isWeaklySuperadditiveGame(v2)
```

---

johnstonIndex   *Compute Johnston index*

Description

johnstonIndex calculates the Johnston index for a simple game.

Usage

```
johnstonIndex(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                 TU game with n players

Value

Johnston index for a specified simple game

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Michael Maerz

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Johnston R.J. (1978) "On the measurement of power: Some reactions to Laver", Environment and Planning A, pp. 907–914

Chakravarty S.R., Mitra M. and Sarkar P. (2015) *A Course on Cooperative Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, p. 124

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
johnstonIndex(c(0,0,0,1,0,0,1))


#player 1 has 3 votes
#player 2 has 2 votes
#player 3 has 1 vote
#majority for the decision is 4 (quota)

library(CoopGame)
#function call generating the game vector:
v <- weightedVotingGameVector(n = 3, w = c(3,2,1), q = 4)

johnstonIndex(v)
#[1] 0.6666667 0.1666667 0.1666667
```

---

koenigBraeuningerIndex

Compute Koenig-Braeuninger index

Description

Calculates the Koenig-Braeuninger index for a specified simple TU game. Note that in general the Koenig-Braeuninger index is not an efficient vector, i.e. the sum of its entries is not always 1. Hence no drawing routine for the Koenig-Braeuninger index is provided.

Usage

```
koenigBraeuningerIndex(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                   TU game with n players

Value

Koenig-Braeuninger index for specified simple game

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Koenig T. and Braeuninger T. (1998) "The inclusiveness of European decision rules", Journal of
Theoretical Politics 10(1), pp. 125–142

Nevison C.H., Zicht, B. and Schoepke S. (1978) "A naive approach to the Banzhaf index of power",
Behavioral Science 23(2), pp. 130–131

Bertini C. and Stach I. (2015) "On Public Values and Power Indices", Decision Making in Manu-
facturing and Services 9(1), pp. 9–25

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,1,1,0,1)
koenigBraeuningerIndex(v)
```

---

majoritySingleVetoGame

Construct a weighted majority game with a single veto player

Description

**Create a list containing all information about a specified weighted majority game with a single
veto player:**
If coalition S has at least 2 members and if the veto player is part of the coalition it generates a value
of 1, otherwise 0.
Note that weighted majority games with a single veto player are always simple games.

Usage

```
majoritySingleVetoGame(n, vetoPlayer)
```

Arguments

n   represents the number of players
vetoPlayer   represents the veto player

Value

A list with three elements representing the specified weighted majority game with a single veto player (n, vetoPlayer, Game vector v)

Related Functions

majoritySingleVetoGameValue, majoritySingleVetoGameVector

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Jackson M.O. (2008) *Social and Economic Networks*, Princeton University Press, p. 415

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
majoritySingleVetoGame(n=3, vetoPlayer=1)
```

---

majoritySingleVetoGameValue

Compute value of a coalition for a weighted majority game with a single veto player

---

Description

Coalition value for a weighted majority game with a single veto player:
For further information see majoritySingleVetoGame

Usage

```
majoritySingleVetoGameValue(S, vetoPlayer)
```

Arguments

S	numeric vector with coalition of players
vetoPlayer	represents the veto player

Value

1 if vetoPlayer is included in S and S is not a singleton coalition, 0 otherwise

Author(s)

Michael Maerz

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Jackson M.O. (2008) *Social and Economic Networks*, Princeton University Press, p. 415

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
majoritySingleVetoGameValue(S=c(1,2), vetoPlayer=1)
```

---

majoritySingleVetoGameVector

Compute game vector for a weighted majority game with a single veto player

---

Description

Game vector for a weighted majority game with a single veto player:
For further information see majoritySingleVetoGame

Usage

```
majoritySingleVetoGameVector(n, vetoPlayer)
```

Arguments

n	represents the number of players
vetoPlayer	represents the veto player

Value

Game Vector where each elements contains 1 if vetoPlayer is included in S and S is not a singleton coalition, 0 otherwise

Author(s)

Michael Maerz

References

Jackson M.O. (2008) *Social and Economic Networks*, Princeton University Press, p. 415

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
majoritySingleVetoGameVector(n=3, vetoPlayer=1)
```

---

modiclus	*Compute modiclus*

Description

Calculates the modiclus of a TU game with a non-empty imputation set and n players. Note that the modiclus is also know as the modified nucleolus in the literature. Due to complexity of modiclus computation we recommend to use this function for at most n=11 players. Note that the modiclus is a member of the set of preimputations.

Usage

```
modiclus(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
            TU game with n players

Value

Numeric vector of length n representing the modiclus (aka modified nucleolus) of the specified TU game.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

References

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 124–132

Sudhoelter P. (1997) "The Modified Nucleolus. Properties and Axiomatizations", Int. Journal of Game Theory 26(2), pp. 147–182

Sudhoelter P. (1996) "The Modified Nucleolus as Canonical Representation of Weighted Majority Games", Mathematics of Operations Research 21(3), pp. 734–756

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
modiclus(c(1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5))


library(CoopGame)
modiclus(c(0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 5, 8, 9, 10, 8, 13, 15, 16, 17, 21))
#[1] 4.25 5.25 5.75 5.75
```

---

nevisonIndex   *Compute Nevison index*

Description

Calculates the Nevison index for a specified simple TU game. Note that in general the Nevison index is not an efficient vector, i.e. the sum of its entries is not always 1. Hence no drawing routine for the Nevison index is provided.

Usage

```
nevisonIndex(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                 TU game with n players

Value

Nevison index for a specified simple game

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Nevison, H. (1979) "Structural power and satisfaction in simple games", In: Applied Game Theory, Springer, pp. 39–57

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,1,1,0,1)
nevisonIndex(v)
```

nonNormalizedBanzhafIndex

Compute non-normalized Banzhaf index

Description

non-normalized Banzhaf index for a specified simple game, see formula (7.5) on p. 119 of the book by Chakravarty, Mitra and Sarkar

Usage

```
nonNormalizedBanzhafIndex(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Value

The return value is a vector which contains the non-normalized Banzhaf index for each player.

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Chakravarty S.R., Mitra M. and Sarkar P. (2015) *A Course on Cooperative Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 118–119

Bertini C. and Stach I. (2011) "Banzhaf voting power measure", Encyclopedia of Power, SAGE Publications, pp. 54–55

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
nonNormalizedBanzhafIndex(dictatorGameVector(n=3, dictator=1))


library(CoopGame)
v<-weightedVotingGameVector(n=4,w=c(8,6,4,2),q=c(12))
nonNormalizedBanzhafIndex(v)
#[1] 0.625 0.375 0.375 0.125

library(CoopGame)
v<- apexGameVector(n = 4,apexPlayer=3)
nonNormalizedBanzhafIndex(v)
```

```
#[1] 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.25

library(CoopGame)
#N=c(1,2,3), w=(50,49,1), q=51
v=weightedVotingGameVector(n=3, w=c(50,49,1),q=51)
nonNormalizedBanzhafIndex(v)
#[1] 0.75 0.25 0.25

library(CoopGame)
v<-weightedVotingGameVector(n=3,w=c(50,30,20),q=c(67))
nonNormalizedBanzhafIndex(v)
#[1] 0.75 0.25 0.25
```

---

normalizedBanzhafIndex

Compute normalized Banzhaf index

Description

Normalized Banzhaf index for a specified simple game, see formula (7.6) on p. 119 of the book by Chakravarty, Mitra and Sarkar

Usage

```
normalizedBanzhafIndex(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                     TU game with n players

Value

The return value is a numeric vector which contains the normalized Banzhaf index for each player.

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peters H. (2015) *Game Theory: A Multi-Leveled Approach*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 367–370

Chakravarty S.R., Mitra M. and Sarkar P. (2015) *A Course on Cooperative Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 118–119

Bertini C. and Stach I. (2011) "Banzhaf voting power measure", Encyclopedia of Power, SAGE Publications, pp. 54–55

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
normalizedBanzhafIndex(dictatorGameVector(n=3, dictator=1))


library(CoopGame)
v<-weightedVotingGameVector(n=4,w=c(8,6,4,2),q=c(12))
normalizedBanzhafIndex(v)
#[1] 0.41666667 0.25000000 0.25000000 0.08333333

library(CoopGame)
v<- apexGameVector(n = 4,apexPlayer=3)
normalizedBanzhafIndex(v)
#[1] 0.1666667 0.1666667 0.5000000 0.1666667

library(CoopGame)
#N=c(1,2,3), w=(50,49,1), q=51
v=weightedVotingGameVector(n=3, w=c(50,49,1),q=51)
normalizedBanzhafIndex(v)
#[1] 0.6 0.2 0.2

library(CoopGame)
v<-weightedVotingGameVector(n=3,w=c(50,30,20),q=c(67))
normalizedBanzhafIndex(v)
#[1] 0.6 0.2 0.2
```

---

normalizedBanzhafValue

Compute normalized Banzhaf value

Description

normalizedBanzhafValue computes the normalized Banzhaf value for a specified TU game. The corresponding formula can e.g. be found in the article by Stach (2017), p. 77.

Usage

```
normalizedBanzhafValue(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Value

The return value is a numeric vector which contains the normalized Banzhaf value for each player.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Gambarelli G. (2011) "Banzhaf value", Encyclopedia of Power, SAGE Publications, pp. 53–54

Stach I. (2017) "Sub-Coalitional Approach to Values", In: Nguyen, N.T. and Kowalczyk, R. (Eds.): Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXVI, Springer, pp. 74–86

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
normalizedBanzhafValue(c(0,0,0,1,2,3,6))


#Example from paper by Gambarelli (2011)
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,1,2,1,3)
normalizedBanzhafValue(v)
#[1] 1.1538462 0.6923077 1.1538462
#Expected Result: 15/13  9/13  15/13
```

---

nucleolus   *Compute nucleolus*

Description

Computes the nucleolus of a TU game with a non-empty imputation set and n players. Note that the nucleolus is a member of the imputation set.

Usage

```
nucleolus(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                    TU game with n players

Value

Numeric vector of length n representing the nucleolus.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Daniel Gebele <daniel.a.gebele@stud.hs-kempten.de>

References

Schmeidler D. (1969) "The nucleolus of a characteristic function game", SIAM Journal on applied mathematics 17(6), pp. 1163–1170

Kohlberg E. (1971) "On the nucleolus of a characteristic function game", SIAM Journal on applied mathematics 20(1), pp. 62–66

Kopelowitz A. (1967) "Computation of the kernels of simple games and the nucleolus of n-person games", Technical Report, Department of Mathematics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 45 pages.

Megiddo N. (1974) "On the nonmonotonicity of the bargaining set, the kernel and the nucleolus of a game", SIAM Journal on applied mathematics 27(2), pp. 355–358

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 82–86

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
nucleolus(c(1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5))


library(CoopGame)
nucleolus(c(0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 5, 8, 9, 10, 8, 13, 15, 16, 17, 21))
#[1] 3.5 4.5 5.5 7.5

#Final example:
#Estate division problem from Babylonian Talmud with E=300,
#see e.g. seminal paper by Aumann & Maschler from 1985 on
#'Game Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud'
library(CoopGame)
v<-bankruptcyGameVector(n=3,d=c(100,200,300),E=300)
nucleolus(v)
#[1]  50 100 150
```

---

perCapitaNucleolus | *Compute per capita nucleolus*

Description

perCapitaNucleolus calculates the per capita nucleolus for a TU game with a non-empty imputation set specified by a game vector. Note that the per capita nucleolus is a member of the imputation set.

Usage

```
perCapitaNucleolus(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                      TU game with n players

Value

per capita nucleolus for a specified TU game with n players

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

References

Young H.P. (1985) "Monotonic Solutions of cooperative games", Int. Journal of Game Theory
14(2), pp. 65–72

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
perCapitaNucleolus(c(1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5))


#Example from YOUNG 1985, p. 68
v<-costSharingGameVector(n=3,C=c(15,20,55,35,61,65,78))
perCapitaNucleolus(v)
#[1]  0.6666667  1.1666667 10.1666667
```

Prenucleolus   *Compute prenucleolus*

Description

Computes the prenucleolus of a TU game with n players. Note that the prenucleolus is a member
of the set of preimputations.

Usage

```
prenucleolus(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                 TU game with n players

Value

Numeric vector of length n representing the prenucleolus.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Daniel Gebele <daniel.a.gebele@stud.hs-kempten.de>

References

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 107–132

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
prenucleolus(c(1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5))


#Example 5.5.12 from Peleg/Sudhoelter, p. 96
library(CoopGame)
prenucleolus(c(0,0,0,10,0,0,2))
#Output
#[1]  3  3 -4
#In the above example nucleolus and prenucleolus do not coincide!

library(CoopGame)
prenucleolus(c(0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 5, 8, 9, 10, 8, 13, 15, 16, 17, 21))
# [1] 3.5 4.5 5.5 7.5

#Final example:
#Estate division problem from Babylonian Talmud with E=200,
#see e.g. seminal paper by Aumann & Maschler from 1985 on
#'Game Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud'
library(CoopGame)
v<-bankruptcyGameVector(n=3,d=c(100,200,300),E=200)
prenucleolus(v)
#[1]  50 75 75
#Note that nucleolus and prenucleolus need to coincide for the above game
```

---

propensityToDisrupt   *Compute propensity to disrupt*

Description

propensityToDisrupt for calculating the propensity of disrupt for game vector v, an allocation x and a specified coalition S

Usage

```
propensityToDisrupt(v, x, S)
```

Arguments

v	Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players
x	numeric vector containing allocations for each player
S	numeric vector with coalition of players

Value

propensity to disrupt as numerical value

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Littlechild S.C. and Vaidya K.G. (1976) "The propensity to disrupt and the disruption nucleolus of a characteristic function game", Int. Journal of Game Theory 5(2), pp. 151–161

Staudacher J. and Anwander J. (2019) "Conditions for the uniqueness of the Gately point for cooperative games", arXiv preprint, arXiv:1901.01485, 10 pages.

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,4,0,3,6)
x=c(2,3,1)
propensityToDisrupt(v,x,S=c(1))
```

proportionalNucleolus   *Compute proportional nucleolus*

Description

proportionalNucleolus calculates the proportional nucleolus for a TU game with a non-empty imputation set and n players specified by game vector. Note that the proportional nucleolus is a member of the imputation set.

Usage

```
proportionalNucleolus(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                TU game with n players

Value

proportional nucleolus for specified TU game with n players

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

References

Young H. P., Okada N. and Hashimoto, T. (1982) "Cost allocation in water resources development", Water resources research 18(3), pp. 463–475

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v<-c(0,0,0,48,60,72,140)
proportionalNucleolus(v)
```

---

publicGoodIndex   *Compute Public Good index*

Description

Calculates the Public Good index (aka Holler index) for a specified simple game.

Usage

```
publicGoodIndex(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                           TU game with n players

Value

The return value is a vector containing the Public Good index

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Holler M.J. and Packel E.W. (1983) "Power, luck and the right index", Zeitschrift fuer Nation-aloekonomie 43(1), pp. 21–29

Holler M.J. (1982) "Forming coalitions and measuring voting power", Political Studies 30(2), pp. 262–271

Holler M. (2011) "Public Goods index", Encyclopedia of Power, SAGE Publications, pp. 541–542

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
publicGoodIndex(v=c(0,0,0,1,1,0,1))


#Example from Holler (2011) illustrating paradox of weighted voting
library(CoopGame)
v=weightedVotingGameVector(n=5,w=c(35,20,15,15,15), q=51)
publicGoodIndex(v)
#[1] 0.2666667 0.1333333 0.2000000 0.2000000 0.2000000
```

Description

Calculates the (normalized) Public Good value for a specified nonnegative TU game. Note that the normalized Public Good value is sometimes also referred to as Holler value in the literature. Our function implements the formula from Definition 5.4, p. 19, in the paper by Bertini and Stach from 2015.

Usage

```
publicGoodValue(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Value

Public Good value for specified nonnegative TU game

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Holler M.J. and Li X. (1995) "From public good index to public value. An axiomatic approach and generalization", Control and Cybernetics 24, pp. 257–270

Bertini C. and Stach I. (2015) "On Public Values and Power Indices", Decision Making in Manufacturing and Services 9(1), pp. 9–25

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,0.7,11,0,15)
publicGoodValue(v)
```

---

publicHelpChiIndex   *Compute Public Help index Chi*

Description

Calculates the Public Help index Chi for a specified simple TU game. Note that the greek letter Xi (instead of Chi) was used in the original paper by Bertini and Stach (2015).

Usage

```
publicHelpChiIndex(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                       TU game with n players

Value

Public Help index Chi for specified simple game

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Bertini C. and Stach I. (2015) "On Public Values and Power Indices", Decision Making in Manufacturing and Services 9(1), pp. 9–25

Stach I. (2016) "Power Measures and Public Goods", In: Nguyen, N.T. and Kowalczyk, R. (Eds.): Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXIII, Springer, pp. 99–110

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
publicHelpChiIndex(v=c(0,0,0,0,1,0,1))


#Example from original paper by Stach (2016), p. 105:
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,1,1,0,1)
publicHelpChiIndex(v)
#result: 0.4583333 0.2708333 0.2708333

#Second example from original paper by Stach (2016), p. 105:
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,0,1)
publicHelpChiIndex(v)
#result: 0.3981481 0.2376543 0.2376543 0.1265432
```

publicHelpChiValue   *Compute (normalized) Public Help value Chi*

Description

Calculates the (normalized) Public Help value Chi by Bertini & Stach (2015) for a nonnegative TU game. Note that the greek letter Xi (instead of Chi) was used in the original paper by Bertini and Stach (2015).

Usage

```
publicHelpChiValue(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Value

Public Help value Chi for specified nonnegative TU game

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Bertini C. and Stach I. (2015) "On Public Values and Power Indices", Decision Making in Manufacturing and Services 9(1), pp. 9–25

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,2,2,0,2)
publicHelpChiValue(v)
```

---

publicHelpIndex   *Compute Public Help index Theta*

Description

Calculates the Public Help index Theta for a specified simple TU game. Note that the Public Help index Theta goes back to the paper by Bertini, Gambarelli and Stach (2008) and is frequently simply referred to referred to Public Help index in the literature.

Usage

```
publicHelpIndex(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                           TU game with n players

Value

Public Help index Theta for specified simple game

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Bertini C., Gambarelli G. and Stach I. (2008) "A public help index", In: Braham, M. and Steffen, F. (Eds): Power, freedom, and voting: Essays in Honour of Manfred J. Holler, pp. 83–98

Bertini C. and Stach I. (2015) "On Public Values and Power Indices", Decision Making in Manufacturing and Services 9(1), pp. 9–25

Stach I. (2016) "Power Measures and Public Goods", In: Nguyen, N.T. and Kowalczyk, R. (Eds.): Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXIII, Springer, pp. 99–110

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
publicHelpIndex(v=c(0,0,0,0,1,0,1))


#Example from paper by Stach (2016), p. 105:
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,1,1,0,1)
publicHelpIndex(v)
#result: 0.4285714 0.2857143 0.2857143
```

```
#Second example from paper by Stach (2016), p. 105:
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,0,1)
publicHelpIndex(v)
#result: 0.3529412 0.2352941 0.2352941 0.1764706
```

---

publicHelpValue *Compute Public Help value Theta*

Description

publicHelpValue calculates the (normalized) Public Help value Theta for a specified nonnegative TU game. Our function implements the formula from Definition 5.7, p. 20, in the paper by Bertini and Stach from 2015.

Usage

```
publicHelpValue(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
           TU game with n players

Value

Public Help value Theta for specified nonnegative TU game

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Bertini C. and Stach I. (2015) "On Public Values and Power Indices", Decision Making in Manufacturing and Services 9(1), pp. 9–25

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,0.7,11,0,15)
publicHelpValue(v)
```

---

raeIndex   *Compute Rae index*

Description

raeIndex calculates the Rae index for a specified simple TU game. Note that in general the Rae index is not an efficient vector, i.e. the sum of its entries is not always 1. Hence no drawing routine for the Rae index is provided.

Usage

```
raeIndex(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                     TU game with n players

Value

Rae index for specified simple game

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Rae, D.W. (1969) "Decision-rules and individual values in constitutional choice", American Political Science Review 63(1), pp. 40–56

Chakravarty S.R., Mitra M. and Sarkar P. (2015) *A Course on Cooperative Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 119–120

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,1,1,0,1)
raeIndex(v)


library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,0,1)
raeIndex(v)
#result: [1] 0.875 0.625 0.625 0.500
```

---

rawBanzhafIndex   *Compute raw Banzhaf Index*

Description

Raw Banzhaf Index for a specified simple game, see formula (7.4) on p. 118 of the book by Chakravarty, Mitra and Sarkar

Usage

```
rawBanzhafIndex(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Value

The return value is a numeric vector which contains the raw Banzhaf index for each player.

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Chakravarty S.R., Mitra M. and Sarkar P. (2015) *A Course on Cooperative Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 118–119

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
rawBanzhafIndex(apexGameVector(n=3, apexPlayer=1))


v<- apexGameVector(n = 4,apexPlayer=3)
rawBanzhafIndex(v)
#[1] 2 2 6 2

#N=c(1,2,3), w=(50,49,1), q=51
v=weightedVotingGameVector(n=3, w=c(50,49,1),q=51)
rawBanzhafIndex(v)
#[1] 3 1 1

v<-weightedVotingGameVector(n=3,w=c(50,30,20),q=c(67))
rawBanzhafIndex(v)
#[1] 3 1 1
```

---

rawBanzhafValue   *Compute raw Banzhaf Value*

Description

raw Banzhaf Value, i.e. the Banzhaf Value without the division by the scaling factor $2^{(n-1)}$

Usage

```
rawBanzhafValue(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                     TU game with n players

Value

The return value is a numeric vector which contains the raw Banzhaf value for each player.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Chakravarty S.R., Mitra M. and Sarkar P. (2015) *A Course on Cooperative Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 118–119

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v = c(0,0,0,1,1,2,5)
rawBanzhafValue(v)


library(CoopGame)
v = c(0,0,0,2,2,3,5)
rawBanzhafValue(v)
#[1] 6 8 8
```

---

reasonableSetVertices   *Compute vertices of reasonable set*

Description

Calculates the vertices of the reasonable set for given game vector.

Usage

```
reasonableSetVertices(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                  TU game with n players

Value

rows of the matrix are the vertices of the reasonable set

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Milnor J.W. (1953) *Reasonable Outcomes for N-person Games*, Rand Corporation, Research Memorandum RM 916.

Branzei R., Dimitrov D. and Tijs S. (2006) *Models in cooperative game theory*, Springer, p. 21

Chakravarty S.R., Mitra M. and Sarkar P. (2015) *A Course on Cooperative Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 43–44

Gerard-Varet L.A. and Zamir S. (1987) "Remarks on the reasonable set of outcomes in a general coalition function form game", Int. Journal of Game Theory 16(2), pp. 123–143

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
reasonableSetVertices(c(0,0,0,1,1,1,2))


library(CoopGame)
v <- c(0,0,0,3,3,3,6)
reasonableSetVertices(v)
#      [,1] [,2] [,3]
# [1,]   3    0    3
# [2,]   0    3    3
# [3,]   3    3    0
```

---

shapleyShubikIndex   *Compute Shapley-Shubik index*

Description

Calculates the Shapley-Shubik index for a specified simple game with n players. Note that no separate drawing routine for the Shapley-Shubik index is provide as users can always resort to drawShapleyValue

Usage

```
shapleyShubikIndex(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Value

Shapley-Shubik index for given simple game

Author(s)

Alexandra Tiukkel

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Shapley L.S. and Shubik M. (1954) "A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system". American political science review 48(3), pp. 787–792

Shapley L.S. (1953) "A value for n-person games". In: Kuhn, H., Tucker, A.W. (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Princeton University Press, pp. 307–317

Peters H. (2015) *Game Theory: A Multi-Leveled Approach*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 156–159

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 748–781

Stach I. (2011) "Shapley-Shubik index", Encyclopedia of Power, SAGE Publications, pp. 603–606

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
shapleyShubikIndex(v=c(0,0,0,0,1,0,1))


#Example from Stach (2011):
library(CoopGame)
v=weightedVotingGameVector(n=4,q=50,w=c(10,10,20,30))
```

```
shapleyShubikIndex(v)
#[1] 0.08333333 0.08333333 0.25000000 0.58333333
```

---

shapleyValue   *Compute Shapley value*

Description

Calculates the Shapley value for n players with formula from Lloyd Shapley.

Usage

```
shapleyValue(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                        TU game with n players

Value

Shapley value for given game vector with n players

Author(s)

Alexandra Tiukkel

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Shapley L.S. (1953) "A value for n-person games". In: Kuhn, H., Tucker, A.W. (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Princeton University Press, pp. 307–317

Aumann R.J. (2010) "Some non-superadditive games, and their Shapley values, in the Talmud", Int. Journal of Game Theory 39(1), pp. 3–10

Peters H. (2015) *Game Theory: A Multi-Leveled Approach*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 156–159

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 748–781

Bertini C. (2011) "Shapley value", Encyclopedia of Power, SAGE Publications, p. 600–603

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
shapleyValue(v=c(0,0,0,1,2,3,7.5))


#Example of a non-superadditive game,
#i.e. the inheritance problem due to Ibn Ezra (1146),
#from paper by Robert Aumann from 2010 on
#'Some non-superadditive games, and their Shapley values, in the Talmud'
library(CoopGame)
Aumann2010Example<-c(120,60,40,30,120,120,120,60,60,40,120,120,120,60,120)
shapleyValue(Aumann2010Example)
#[1] 80.83333 20.83333 10.83333  7.50000
```

---

simplifiedModiclus   *Compute simplified modiclus*

Description

Computes the simplified modiclus of a TU game with a non-empty imputation set and n players.
Note that the simplified modiclus is a member of the set of preimputations.

Usage

```
simplifiedModiclus(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                    TU game with n players

Value

Numeric vector of length n representing the simplified modiclus of the specified TU game.

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

References

Tarashnina S. (2011) "The simplified modified nucleolus of a cooperative TU-game", TOP 19(1),
pp. 150–166

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
simplifiedModiclus(c(0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1))


#Second example:
#Estate division problem from Babylonian Talmud with E=100,
#see e.g. seminal paper by Aumann & Maschler from 1985 on
#'Game Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud'
library(CoopGame)
v<-bankruptcyGameVector(n=3,d=c(100,200,300),E=100)
simplifiedModiclus(v)
#[1]  33.33333 33.33333 33.33333
```

---

stopOnInconsistentEstateAndClaimsVector

Parameter Function stopOnInconsistentEstateAndClaimsVector

Description

stopOnInconsistentEstateAndClaimsVector checks if sum of claims is greater or equal estate (in bankruptcy games). Calculation stops with an error message if claims vector and estate are inconsistent.

Usage

```
stopOnInconsistentEstateAndClaimsVector(paramCheckResult, E, d)
```

Arguments

paramCheckResult

list object for check result with list element 'errCode' for the error code and 'errMessage' for the error message.

E   is the value of the estate in a bankruptcy game

d   numeric vector which contains the claims of each player in a bankruptcy game

Error Code Ranges

Error codes and messages shown to user if error on parameter check occurs

Error Code	Message
1170	Estate E must be less or equal the sum of claims!

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

See Also

Other ParameterChecks_CoopGame: getEmptyParamCheckResult(), stopOnInvalidAllocation(), stopOnInvalidBoolean(), stopOnInvalidClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidCoalitionS(), stopOnInvalidDictator() stopOnInvalidEstate(), stopOnInvalidGameVector(), stopOnInvalidGrandCoalitionN(), stopOnInvalidIndex(), stopOnInvalidLeftRightGloveGame(), stopOnInvalidNChooseB(), stopOnInvalidNumberOfPlayers(), stopOnInvalidNumber(), stopOnInvalidQuota(), stopOnInvalidVetoPlayer(), stopOnInvalidWeightVector(), stopOnParamCheckError()

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
paramCheckResult=getEmptyParamCheckResult()
consistentClaims= c(26,27,55,57)
consistentE = 110
stopOnInconsistentEstateAndClaimsVector(paramCheckResult, d=consistentClaims, E=consistentE)
```

---

stopOnInvalidAllocation

Parameter Function stopOnInvalidAllocation

Description

stopOnInvalidAllocation checks if allocation is specified correctly. Validation result gets stored to object paramCheckResult in case an error occured and causes calculation to stop.

Usage

```
stopOnInvalidAllocation(paramCheckResult, x, n = NULL, v = NULL)
```

Arguments

paramCheckResult

list object for check result with list element 'errCode' for the error code and 'errMessage' for the error message.

x   numeric vector containing allocations for each player

n   represents the number of players

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Error Code Ranges

Error codes and messages shown to user if error on parameter check occurs

Error Code	Message
1100	Allocation 'x' is NULL

1101	Allocation 'x' is not of type numeric.
1102	Allocation 'x' has wrong number of elements as compared to number of players.
1103	Allocation is inconsistent with game vector.

Author(s)

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See Also

Other ParameterChecks_CoopGame: getEmptyParamCheckResult(), stopOnInconsistentEstateAndClaimsVector(),
stopOnInvalidBoolean(), stopOnInvalidClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidCoalitionS(), stopOnInvalidDictator(),
stopOnInvalidEstate(), stopOnInvalidGameVector(), stopOnInvalidGrandCoalitionN(),
stopOnInvalidIndex(), stopOnInvalidLeftRightGloveGame(), stopOnInvalidNChooseB(),
stopOnInvalidNumberOfPlayers(), stopOnInvalidNumber(), stopOnInvalidQuota(), stopOnInvalidVetoPlayer(),
stopOnInvalidWeightVector(), stopOnParamCheckError()

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
paramCheckResult=getEmptyParamCheckResult()
validAllocation=c(1,2,3)
stopOnInvalidAllocation(paramCheckResult,x=validAllocation,n=3)
```

---

stopOnInvalidBoolean   *Parameter Function stopOnInvalidBoolean*

Description

stopOnInvalidBoolean checks definition is the parameter a boolean

Usage

```
stopOnInvalidBoolean(paramCheckResult, boolean)
```

Arguments

paramCheckResult

list object for check result with list element 'errCode' for the error code and
'errMessage' for the error message.

boolean   parameter which is checked if it is a valid boolean.

Error Code Ranges

Error codes and messages shown to user if error on parameter check occurs

Error Code	Message
1120	Parameter is not a boolean value
1121	Parameter is not of length 1

Author(s)

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Franz Mueller

See Also

Other ParameterChecks_CoopGame: getEmptyParamCheckResult(), stopOnInconsistentEstateAndClaimsVector(),
stopOnInvalidAllocation(), stopOnInvalidClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidCoalitionS(),
stopOnInvalidDictator(), stopOnInvalidEstate(), stopOnInvalidGameVector(), stopOnInvalidGrandCoalitionN
stopOnInvalidIndex(), stopOnInvalidLeftRightGloveGame(), stopOnInvalidNChooseB(),
stopOnInvalidNumberOfPlayers(), stopOnInvalidNumber(), stopOnInvalidQuota(), stopOnInvalidVetoPlayer(),
stopOnInvalidWeightVector(), stopOnParamCheckError()

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
paramCheckResult=getEmptyParamCheckResult()
validBoolean = TRUE
stopOnInvalidBoolean(paramCheckResult, validBoolean)
```

---

stopOnInvalidClaimsVector

Parameter Function stopOnInvalidClaimsVector

Description

stopOnInvalidClaimsVector checks if claims vector in a bankruptcy game is specified correctly.
Validation result gets stored to object paramCheckResult in case an error occured and causes stop
otherwise.

Usage

```
stopOnInvalidClaimsVector(paramCheckResult, n, d)
```

Arguments

paramCheckResult

list object for check result with list element 'errCode' for the error code and 'errMessage' for the error message.

n represents the number of players

d numeric vector which contains the claims of each player in a bankruptcy game

Error Code Ranges

Error codes and messages shown to user if error on parameter check occurs

Error Code	Message
1160	Number of claims must equal the number of players in the bankruptcy game!
1161	Invalid claims vector as d must be numeric

Author(s)

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See Also

Other ParameterChecks_CoopGame: getEmptyParamCheckResult(), stopOnInconsistentEstateAndClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidAllocation(), stopOnInvalidBoolean(), stopOnInvalidCoalitionS(), stopOnInvalidDictator(), stopOnInvalidEstate(), stopOnInvalidGameVector(), stopOnInvalidGrandCoalitionN(), stopOnInvalidIndex(), stopOnInvalidLeftRightGloveGame(), stopOnInvalidNChooseB(), stopOnInvalidNumberOfPlayers(), stopOnInvalidNumber(), stopOnInvalidQuota(), stopOnInvalidVetoPlayer(), stopOnInvalidWeightVector(), stopOnParamCheckError()

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
paramCheckResult=getEmptyParamCheckResult()
validClaimsVector = c(100,150,200)
stopOnInvalidClaimsVector(paramCheckResult, n=3, d=validClaimsVector)
```

---

stopOnInvalidCoalitionS

Parameter Function stopOnInvalidCoalitionS

Description

stopOnInvalidCoalitionS checks if coalition S as subset of grand coalition N is specified correctly and causes calculation to stop otherwise.

Usage

```
stopOnInvalidCoalitionS(paramCheckResult, S, N = NULL, n = NULL, v = NULL)
```

Arguments

paramCheckResult

        list object for check result with list element 'errCode' for the error code and 'errMessage' for the error message.

S	numeric vector with coalition of players
N	represents the grand coalition.
n	represents the number of players
v	Numeric vector of length $2^n - 1$ representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Error Code Ranges

Error codes and messages shown to user if error on parameter check occurs

Error Code	Message
1020	Coalition vector S is invalid as 'NULL'
1021	Coalition vector S is invalid as not numeric
1022	Coalition vector S no subset of grand coalition N
1023	The number of players in S cannot be greater than the number of players in N
1024	Specified coalition is inconsistent with game vector

Author(s)

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See Also

Other ParameterChecks_CoopGame: getEmptyParamCheckResult(), stopOnInconsistentEstateAndClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidAllocation(), stopOnInvalidBoolean(), stopOnInvalidClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidDictator(), stopOnInvalidEstate(), stopOnInvalidGameVector(), stopOnInvalidGrandCoalitionN(), stopOnInvalidIndex(), stopOnInvalidLeftRightGloveGame(), stopOnInvalidNChooseB(), stopOnInvalidNumberOfPlayers(), stopOnInvalidNumber(), stopOnInvalidQuota(), stopOnInvalidVetoPlayer(), stopOnInvalidWeightVector(), stopOnParamCheckError()

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
paramCheckResult=getEmptyParamCheckResult()
validCoalition = c(1,2,3)
stopOnInvalidCoalitionS(paramCheckResult, S=validCoalition, N=c(1,2,3,4,5))
```

stopOnInvalidDictator *Parameter Function stopOnInvalidDictator*

Description

stopOnInvalidDictator checks if dictator is specified correctly in a dictator game. Validation result gets stored to object paramCheckResult in case an error occured and causes calculation to stop.

Usage

```
stopOnInvalidDictator(paramCheckResult, dictator, n = NULL)
```

Arguments

paramCheckResult

list object for check result with list element 'errCode' for the error code and 'errMessage' for the error message.

dictator   Number of the dictator

n   represents the number of players

Error Code Ranges

Error codes and messages shown to user if error on parameter check occurs

Error Code	Message
1090	'dictator' does not contain only one single element
1091	Representation of 'dictator' is not 'numeric'
1092	'dictator' is not element of grand coalition
1093	'dictator' is 'NULL'

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See Also

Other ParameterChecks_CoopGame: getEmptyParamCheckResult(), stopOnInconsistentEstateAndClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidAllocation(), stopOnInvalidBoolean(), stopOnInvalidClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidCoalitionS stopOnInvalidEstate(), stopOnInvalidGameVector(), stopOnInvalidGrandCoalitionN(), stopOnInvalidIndex(), stopOnInvalidLeftRightGloveGame(), stopOnInvalidNChooseB(), stopOnInvalidNumberOfPlayers(), stopOnInvalidNumber(), stopOnInvalidQuota(), stopOnInvalidVetoPlayer(), stopOnInvalidWeightVector(), stopOnParamCheckError()

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
paramCheckResult=getEmptyParamCheckResult()
validDictator = 3
stopOnInvalidDictator(paramCheckResult,dictator=validDictator,n=3)
```

---

stopOnInvalidEstate   *Parameter Function stopOnInvalidEstate*

Description

stopOnInvalidBankruptcy checks if estate is specified correctly (as parameter in a bankruptcy game). Validation result gets stored to object paramCheckResult in case an error occured and causes stop otherwise.

Usage

```
stopOnInvalidEstate(paramCheckResult, E)
```

Arguments

paramCheckResult

list object for check result with list element 'errCode' for the error code and 'errMessage' for the error message.

E   is the value of the estate in a bankruptcy game

Error Code Ranges

Error codes and messages shown to user if error on parameter check occurs

Error Code	Message
1150	Estate must be nonnegative!
1151	Estate must be numeric!
1152	Invalid estate as E is NULL

Author(s)

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See Also

Other ParameterChecks_CoopGame: getEmptyParamCheckResult(), stopOnInconsistentEstateAndClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidAllocation(), stopOnInvalidBoolean(), stopOnInvalidClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidCoalitionS stopOnInvalidDictator(), stopOnInvalidGameVector(), stopOnInvalidGrandCoalitionN(), stopOnInvalidIndex(), stopOnInvalidLeftRightGloveGame(), stopOnInvalidNChooseB(), stopOnInvalidNumberOfPlayers(), stopOnInvalidNumber(), stopOnInvalidQuota(), stopOnInvalidVetoPlayer(), stopOnInvalidWeightVector(), stopOnParamCheckError()

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
paramCheckResult=getEmptyParamCheckResult()
validEstate = 55
stopOnInvalidEstate(paramCheckResult, E=validEstate)
```

---

stopOnInvalidGameVector

Parameter Function stopOnInvalidGameVector

Description

stopOnInvalidGameVector checks if game vector v is specified correctly. Validation result gets stored to object paramCheckResult in case an error occured and causes calculation to stop.

Usage

```
stopOnInvalidGameVector(paramCheckResult, v, n = NULL)
```

Arguments

paramCheckResult

list object for check result with list element 'errCode' for the error code and 'errMessage' for the error message.

v Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

n represents the number of players

Error Code Ranges

Error codes and messages shown to user if error on parameter check occurs

Error Code	Message
1000	Game vector is invalid as 'NULL'
1001	Number of elements in game vector is invalid
1002	Type of game vector is not numeric
1003	Game vector has different number of players than n
1004	Null game specified, value for every player is 0

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See Also

Other ParameterChecks_CoopGame: getEmptyParamCheckResult(), stopOnInconsistentEstateAndClaimsVector(),
stopOnInvalidAllocation(), stopOnInvalidBoolean(), stopOnInvalidClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidCoalitionS
stopOnInvalidDictator(), stopOnInvalidEstate(), stopOnInvalidGrandCoalitionN(), stopOnInvalidIndex(),
stopOnInvalidLeftRightGloveGame(), stopOnInvalidNChooseB(), stopOnInvalidNumberOfPlayers(),
stopOnInvalidNumber(), stopOnInvalidQuota(), stopOnInvalidVetoPlayer(), stopOnInvalidWeightVector(),
stopOnParamCheckError()

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
validGameVector=c(0,0,0,60,60,60,72)
stopOnInvalidGameVector(paramCheckResult,validGameVector)
```

---

stopOnInvalidGrandCoalitionN

Parameter Function stopOnInvalidGrandCoalitionN

Description

stopOnInvalidGrandCoalitionN checks if grand coalition N is specified correctly and causes calculation to stop otherwise.

Usage

```
stopOnInvalidGrandCoalitionN(paramCheckResult, N)
```

Arguments

paramCheckResult

list object for check result with list element 'errCode' for the error code and
'errMessage' for the error message.

N   represents the grand coalition.

Error Code Ranges

Error codes and messages shown to user if error on parameter check occurs

Error Code	Message
1010	Grand coalition vector N is invalid as 'NULL'
1011	Grand coalition vector N is invalid as not numeric

Author(s)

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See Also

Other ParameterChecks_CoopGame: getEmptyParamCheckResult(), stopOnInconsistentEstateAndClaimsVector(),
stopOnInvalidAllocation(), stopOnInvalidBoolean(), stopOnInvalidClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidCoalitionS
stopOnInvalidDictator(), stopOnInvalidEstate(), stopOnInvalidGameVector(), stopOnInvalidIndex(),
stopOnInvalidLeftRightGloveGame(), stopOnInvalidNChooseB(), stopOnInvalidNumberOfPlayers(),
stopOnInvalidNumber(), stopOnInvalidQuota(), stopOnInvalidVetoPlayer(), stopOnInvalidWeightVector(),
stopOnParamCheckError()

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
paramCheckResult=getEmptyParamCheckResult()
validGrandCoalition = c(1,2,3,4,5)
stopOnInvalidGrandCoalitionN(paramCheckResult, N=validGrandCoalition)
```

---

stopOnInvalidIndex   *Parameter Function stopOnInvalidIndex*

Description

stopOnInvalidIndex checks if coalition function (in the form of either v or A) is specified correctly
and causes causes calculation to stop otherwise.

Usage

```
stopOnInvalidIndex(paramCheckResult, index, n = NULL)
```

Arguments

paramCheckResult

list object for check result with list element 'errCode' for the error code and
'errMessage' for the error message.

index   index which is checked to be a valid index

n   represents the number of players

Error Code Ranges

Error codes and messages shown to user if error on parameter check occurs

Error Code	Message
1070	Index is 'NULL'.
1071	Index is 'not numeric'.
1072	Index is within the wrong range according to number of players n.

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See Also

Other ParameterChecks_CoopGame: getEmptyParamCheckResult(), stopOnInconsistentEstateAndClaimsVector(),
stopOnInvalidAllocation(), stopOnInvalidBoolean(), stopOnInvalidClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidCoalitionS
stopOnInvalidDictator(), stopOnInvalidEstate(), stopOnInvalidGameVector(), stopOnInvalidGrandCoalitionN
stopOnInvalidLeftRightGloveGame(), stopOnInvalidNChooseB(), stopOnInvalidNumberOfPlayers(),
stopOnInvalidNumber(), stopOnInvalidQuota(), stopOnInvalidVetoPlayer(), stopOnInvalidWeightVector(),
stopOnParamCheckError()

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
v=c(1:7)
paramCheckResult=getEmptyParamCheckResult()
validIndex = 5
stopOnInvalidIndex(paramCheckResult, index=validIndex, n=3)
```

---

stopOnInvalidLeftRightGloveGame
Parameter Function stopOnInvalidLeftRightGloveGame

Description

stopOnInvalidLeftRightGloveGame checks if L (left gloves) and R (right gloves) are specified as
parameter correctly (also regarding grand coalition). Validation result gets stored to object param-
CheckResult in case an error occured and causes calculation to stop.

Usage

```
stopOnInvalidLeftRightGloveGame(paramCheckResult, L, R, N)
```

Arguments

paramCheckResult

list object for check result with list element 'errCode' for the error code and
'errMessage' for the error message.

L   numeric vector of players owning one left-hand glove each

R   numeric vector of players owning one right-hand glove each

N   represents the grand coalition.

Error Code Ranges

Error codes and messages shown to user if error on parameter check occurs

Error Code	Message
1140	Not all players in L and R included.
1141	L must have size > 0.
1142	R must have size > 0.
1143	L and R have to be disjoint sets.

Author(s)

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See Also

Other ParameterChecks_CoopGame: getEmptyParamCheckResult(), stopOnInconsistentEstateAndClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidAllocation(), stopOnInvalidBoolean(), stopOnInvalidClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidCoalitionS stopOnInvalidDictator(), stopOnInvalidEstate(), stopOnInvalidGameVector(), stopOnInvalidGrandCoalitionN stopOnInvalidIndex(), stopOnInvalidNChooseB(), stopOnInvalidNumberOfPlayers(), stopOnInvalidNumber(), stopOnInvalidQuota(), stopOnInvalidVetoPlayer(), stopOnInvalidWeightVector(), stopOnParamCheckError()

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
paramCheckResult=getEmptyParamCheckResult()
validL=c(1,3)
validR=c(2)
stopOnInvalidLeftRightGloveGame(paramCheckResult, L=validL,R=validR,N=c(1,2,3))
```

---

stopOnInvalidNChooseB *Parameter Function stopOnInvalidNChooseB*

Description

stopOnInvalidNChooseB checks if definition of n choose b is specified correctly and causes stop otherwise.

Usage

```
stopOnInvalidNChooseB(paramCheckResult, n, b)
```

Arguments

paramCheckResult

> list object for check result with list element 'errCode' for the error code and 'errMessage' for the error message.

n   represents the number of players

b   number of players in subset

Error Code Ranges

Error codes and messages shown to user if error on parameter check occurs

Error Code	Message
1080	Number of players 'n' is 'NULL'
1081	Number of involved players 'b' is 'NULL'
1082	Number of players 'n' is not 'numeric'
1083	Number of involved players 'b' is not 'numeric
1084	Number of involved players 'b' is greater than of players 'n'

Author(s)

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See Also

Other ParameterChecks_CoopGame: getEmptyParamCheckResult(), stopOnInconsistentEstateAndClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidAllocation(), stopOnInvalidBoolean(), stopOnInvalidClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidCoalitionS stopOnInvalidDictator(), stopOnInvalidEstate(), stopOnInvalidGameVector(), stopOnInvalidGrandCoalitionN stopOnInvalidIndex(), stopOnInvalidLeftRightGloveGame(), stopOnInvalidNumberOfPlayers(), stopOnInvalidNumber(), stopOnInvalidQuota(), stopOnInvalidVetoPlayer(), stopOnInvalidWeightVector(), stopOnParamCheckError()

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
paramCheckResult=getEmptyParamCheckResult()
validN = 3
validAndConsistentB = 2
stopOnInvalidNChooseB(paramCheckResult, n=validN, b=validAndConsistentB)
```

stopOnInvalidNumber   *Parameter Function stopOnInvalidNumber*

Description

stopOnInvalidNumber checks definition is the parameter a number

Usage

```
stopOnInvalidNumber(paramCheckResult, number)
```

Arguments

paramCheckResult

list object for check result with list element 'errCode' for the error code and 'errMessage' for the error message.

number   input which is checked to be valid number

Error Code Ranges

Error codes and messages shown to user if error on parameter check occurs

Error Code	Message
1130	Parameter is not a number
1131	Parameter is not of length 1

Author(s)

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Franz Mueller

See Also

Other ParameterChecks_CoopGame: getEmptyParamCheckResult(), stopOnInconsistentEstateAndClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidAllocation(), stopOnInvalidBoolean(), stopOnInvalidClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidCoalitionS stopOnInvalidDictator(), stopOnInvalidEstate(), stopOnInvalidGameVector(), stopOnInvalidGrandCoalitionN stopOnInvalidIndex(), stopOnInvalidLeftRightGloveGame(), stopOnInvalidNChooseB(), stopOnInvalidNumberOfPlayers(), stopOnInvalidQuota(), stopOnInvalidVetoPlayer(), stopOnInvalidWeightVed stopOnParamCheckError()

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
paramCheckResult=getEmptyParamCheckResult()
validNumber = 5
stopOnInvalidNumber(paramCheckResult, validNumber)
```

stopOnInvalidNumberOfPlayers

Parameter Function stopOnInvalidNumberOfPlayers

Description

stopOnInvalidNumberOfPlayers checks if number of players is specified correctly and causes calculation to stop otherwise.

Usage

```
stopOnInvalidNumberOfPlayers(paramCheckResult, n)
```

Arguments

paramCheckResult

list object for check result with list element 'errCode' for the error code and 'errMessage' for the error message.

n   represents the number of players

Error Code Ranges

Error codes and messages shown to user if error on parameter check occurs

Error Code	Message
1050	Number of players is invalid as below 2

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See Also

Other ParameterChecks_CoopGame: getEmptyParamCheckResult(), stopOnInconsistentEstateAndClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidAllocation(), stopOnInvalidBoolean(), stopOnInvalidClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidCoalitionS stopOnInvalidDictator(), stopOnInvalidEstate(), stopOnInvalidGameVector(), stopOnInvalidGrandCoalitionN stopOnInvalidIndex(), stopOnInvalidLeftRightGloveGame(), stopOnInvalidNChooseB(), stopOnInvalidNumber(), stopOnInvalidQuota(), stopOnInvalidVetoPlayer(), stopOnInvalidWeightVector(), stopOnParamCheckError()

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
paramCheckResult=getEmptyParamCheckResult()
validNumberOfPlayers = 10
stopOnInvalidNumberOfPlayers(paramCheckResult, n=validNumberOfPlayers)
```

---

stopOnInvalidQuota *Parameter Function stopOnInvalidQuota*

Description

stopOnInvalidQuota checks if qutoa in a weighted voting game is specified correctly. Validation result gets stored to object paramCheckResult in case an error occured and causes calculation to stop.

Usage

```
stopOnInvalidQuota(paramCheckResult, q)
```

Arguments

paramCheckResult

list object for check result with list element 'errCode' for the error code and 'errMessage' for the error message.

q   is the quota

Error Code Ranges

Error codes and messages shown to user if error on parameter check occurs

Error Code	Message
1030	Invalid quota as q is NULL
1031	Quota must be greater than zero!
1032	Quota must be numeric!

Author(s)

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See Also

Other ParameterChecks_CoopGame: getEmptyParamCheckResult(), stopOnInconsistentEstateAndClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidAllocation(), stopOnInvalidBoolean(), stopOnInvalidClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidCoalitionS stopOnInvalidDictator(), stopOnInvalidEstate(), stopOnInvalidGameVector(), stopOnInvalidGrandCoalitionN stopOnInvalidIndex(), stopOnInvalidLeftRightGloveGame(), stopOnInvalidNChooseB(), stopOnInvalidNumberOfPlayers(), stopOnInvalidNumber(), stopOnInvalidVetoPlayer(), stopOnInvalidWeightVector(), stopOnParamCheckError()

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
paramCheckResult=getEmptyParamCheckResult()
validQuota = 3
stopOnInvalidQuota(paramCheckResult, q=validQuota)
```

---

stopOnInvalidVetoPlayer

Parameter Function stopOnInvalidVetoPlayer

Description

stopOnInvalidVetoPlayer checks if vetoPlayer is specified correctly. Validation result gets stored to object paramCheckResult in case an error occured and causes calculation to stop.

Usage

```
stopOnInvalidVetoPlayer(paramCheckResult, vetoPlayer)
```

Arguments

paramCheckResult

list object for check result with list element 'errCode' for the error code and 'errMessage' for the error message.

vetoPlayer   represents the veto player

Error Code Ranges

Error codes and messages shown to user if error on parameter check occurs

Error Code	Message
1190	At least one veto player has to be specified
1191	Only a single veto player is allowed for this game

Author(s)

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See Also

Other ParameterChecks_CoopGame: getEmptyParamCheckResult(), stopOnInconsistentEstateAndClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidAllocation(), stopOnInvalidBoolean(), stopOnInvalidClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidCoalitionS stopOnInvalidDictator(), stopOnInvalidEstate(), stopOnInvalidGameVector(), stopOnInvalidGrandCoalitionN stopOnInvalidIndex(), stopOnInvalidLeftRightGloveGame(), stopOnInvalidNChooseB(), stopOnInvalidNumberOfPlayers(), stopOnInvalidNumber(), stopOnInvalidQuota(), stopOnInvalidWeightVector() stopOnParamCheckError()

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
paramCheckResult=getEmptyParamCheckResult()
validVetoPlayer = 3
stopOnInvalidVetoPlayer(paramCheckResult, vetoPlayer=validVetoPlayer)
```

stopOnInvalidWeightVector

Parameter Function stopOnInvalidWeightVector

Description

stopOnInvalidWeightVector checks if weight vector in a weighted voting game is specified correctly. Validation result gets stored to object paramCheckResult in case an error occured and causes stop otherwise.

Usage

```
stopOnInvalidWeightVector(paramCheckResult, n, w)
```

Arguments

paramCheckResult

list object for check result with list element 'errCode' for the error code and 'errMessage' for the error message.

n   represents the number of players

w   numeric vector which contains the weight of each player

Error Code Ranges

Error codes and messages shown to user if error on parameter check occurs

Error Code	Message
1110	Number of weights must be equal or greater than number of players in coalition!
1111	Invalid weight vector as w is not numeric

Author(s)

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See Also

Other ParameterChecks_CoopGame: getEmptyParamCheckResult(), stopOnInconsistentEstateAndClaimsVector(),
stopOnInvalidAllocation(), stopOnInvalidBoolean(), stopOnInvalidClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidCoalitionS
stopOnInvalidDictator(), stopOnInvalidEstate(), stopOnInvalidGameVector(), stopOnInvalidGrandCoalitionN
stopOnInvalidIndex(), stopOnInvalidLeftRightGloveGame(), stopOnInvalidNChooseB(),
stopOnInvalidNumberOfPlayers(), stopOnInvalidNumber(), stopOnInvalidQuota(), stopOnInvalidVetoPlayer(),
stopOnParamCheckError()

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
paramCheckResult=getEmptyParamCheckResult()
validWeightVector = c(1,2,3)
stopOnInvalidWeightVector(paramCheckResult, n=3, w=validWeightVector)
```

---

stopOnParamCheckError   *stopOnParamCheckError - stop and create error message on error*

Description

stopOnParamCheckError causes and creates error message on base of paramCheckResult parameter
where 'errCode' <> '0' in case error occured.

Usage

```
stopOnParamCheckError(paramCheckResult)
```

Arguments

paramCheckResult

list object for check result with list element 'errCode' for the error code and
'errMessage' for the error message.

Author(s)

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See Also

Other ParameterChecks_CoopGame: getEmptyParamCheckResult(), stopOnInconsistentEstateAndClaimsVector(),
stopOnInvalidAllocation(), stopOnInvalidBoolean(), stopOnInvalidClaimsVector(), stopOnInvalidCoalitionS
stopOnInvalidDictator(), stopOnInvalidEstate(), stopOnInvalidGameVector(), stopOnInvalidGrandCoalitionN
stopOnInvalidIndex(), stopOnInvalidLeftRightGloveGame(), stopOnInvalidNChooseB(),
stopOnInvalidNumberOfPlayers(), stopOnInvalidNumber(), stopOnInvalidQuota(), stopOnInvalidVetoPlayer(),
stopOnInvalidWeightVector()

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
paramCheckResult=getEmptyParamCheckResult()
stopOnParamCheckError(paramCheckResult)
```

---

tauValue   *Compute tau-value*

Description

Calculates the tau-value for a quasi-balanced TU game with n players.

Usage

```
tauValue(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a
                     TU game with n players

Value

tau-value for a quasi-balanced TU game with n players

Author(s)

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Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

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Tijs S. (1981) "Bounds for the core of a game and the t-value", In: Moeschlin, O. and Pallaschke, D. (Eds.): Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, North-Holland, pp. 123–132

Stach I. (2011) "Tijs value", Encyclopedia of Power, SAGE Publications, pp. 667–670

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
tauValue(v=c(0,0,0,0,1,0,1))


#Example from article by Stach (2011)
library(CoopGame)
v=c(0,0,0,1,2,1,3)
```

```
tauValue(v)
#[1] 1.2 0.6 1.2
```

---

unanimityGame   *Construct a unanimity game*

Description

Create a list containing all information about a specified unanimity game:
The player in coalition `T` are the productive players. If all players from `T` are included, the coalition generates value `1`, otherwise `0`.
Note that unanimity games are always simple games.

Usage

```
unanimityGame(n, T)
```

Arguments

n	represents the number of players
T	represents coalition which is subset of grand coalition and neccessary for generating value

Value

A list with three elements representing the unanimity game (n, T, Game vector v)

Related Functions

unanimityGameValue, unanimityGameVector

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 152

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, p. 764

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
unanimityGame(n=3,T=c(1,2))


library(CoopGame)
unanimityGame(n=4,T=c(1,2))
#Output
#$n
#[1] 4
#
#$T
#[1] 1 2

#$v
#[1] 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
```

---

unanimityGameValue   *Compute value of a coalition for a unanimity game*

Description

Coalition value for a specified unanimity game:
For further information see unanimityGame

Usage

```
unanimityGameValue(S, T)
```

Arguments

S	numeric vector with coalition of players
T	represents coalition which is subset of grand coalition N and neccessary for generating value

Value

1 if all players of coalition `T` are included in `S`, else `0`

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

References

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 152

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, p. 764

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
unanimityGameValue(S=c(1,2,3),T=c(2))
```

---

unanimityGameVector   *Compute game vector for a unanimity game*

Description

Game Vector for a specified unanimity game:
For further information see unanimityGame

Usage

```
unanimityGameVector(n, T)
```

Arguments

n	represents the number of players
T	represents coalition which is subset of grand coalition N and neccessary for generating value

Value

Game Vector where each element contains 1 if all players of coalition 'T' are included in 'S' else 0

Author(s)

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 152

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, p. 764

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
unanimityGameVector(n=3,T=c(2))
```

webersetVertices   *Compute vertices of Weber Set*

Description

Calculates the Weber Set for given game vector with n players.

Usage

```
webersetVertices(v)
```

Arguments

v   Numeric vector of length 2^n - 1 representing the values of the coalitions of a TU game with n players

Value

rows of the matrix are the vertices of the Weber Set

Author(s)

Anna Merkle

Franz Mueller

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Weber R.J. (1988) "Probabilistic values for games". In: Roth A.E. (Ed.), The Shapley Value. Essays in in honor of Lloyd S. Shapley, Cambridge University Press, pp. 101–119

Peters H. (2015) *Game Theory: A Multi-Leveled Approach*, 2nd Edition, Springer, pp. 327–329

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
webersetVertices(c(0,0,0,1,1,1,2))


#Example of a 3-player TU game (with a Weber Set with 6 vertices)
library(CoopGame)
v = c(0,1,2,3,4,5,6)
webersetVertices(v)

#Example of a 4-player TU game (with a Weber Set with 14 vertices)
library(CoopGame)
v = c(5,2,4,7,15,15,15,15,15,15,20,20,20,20,35)
webersetVertices(v)
```

---

weightedVotingGame   *Construct a weighted voting game*

Description

Create a list containing all information about a specified weighted voting game:
For a weighted voting game we receive a game vector where each element contains 1 if the sum of
the weights of coalition S is greater or equal than quota q, else 0.
Note that weighted voting games are always simple games.

Usage

```
weightedVotingGame(n, w, q)
```

Arguments

n   represents the number of players

w   numeric vector which contains the weight of each player

q   is the quota

Value

A list with four elements representing the weighted voting game (n, w, q, Game vector v)

Related Functions

weightedVotingGameValue, weightedVotingGameVector

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

References

Peleg B. (2002) "Game-theoretic analysis of voting in committees". in: Handbook of Social Choice
and Welfare 1, pp. 195–201

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 17

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 825–831

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
weightedVotingGame(n=3,w=c(1,2,3),q=4)


library(CoopGame)
weightedVotingGame(n=4,w=c(1,2,3,4),q=5)

#Output:
#$n
#[1] 4

#$w
#[1] 1 2 3 4
#
#$q
#[1] 5
#
#$v
#[1] 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
```

---

weightedVotingGameValue

Compute value of a coalition for a weighted voting game

Description

Coalition value for a specified weighted voting game:
For further information see weightedVotingGame

Usage

```
weightedVotingGameValue(S, w, q)
```

Arguments

S	numeric vector with coalition of players
w	numeric vector which contains the weight of each player
q	is the quota

Value

1 if the sum of the weights of coalition S is greater or equal than quota q else 0

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>

Johannes Anwander <anwander.johannes@gmail.com>

Michael Maerz

References

Peleg B. (2002) "Game-theoretic analysis of voting in committees". in: Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare 1, pp. 195–201

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 17

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 825–831

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
weightedVotingGameValue(S=c(1,2,3),w=c(1,2,3),q=4)
```

---

weightedVotingGameVector

Compute game vector for a weighted voting game (aka quota game)

Description

Game vector for a specified weighted voting game:
For further information see weightedVotingGame

Usage

```
weightedVotingGameVector(n, w, q)
```

Arguments

n	represents the number of players
w	numeric vector which contains the weight of each player
q	is the quota

Value

Game Vector where each element contains 1 if the sum of the weights of coalition S is greater or equal than quota q, else 0

Author(s)

Jochen Staudacher `<jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de>`

Johannes Anwander `<anwander.johannes@gmail.com>`

Michael Maerz

References

Peleg B. (2002) "Game-theoretic analysis of voting in committees". in: Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare 1, pp. 195–201

Peleg B. and Sudhoelter P. (2007) *Theory of cooperative games*, 2nd Edition, Springer, p. 17

Maschler M., Solan E. and Zamir S. (2013) *Game Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 825–831

Examples

```
library(CoopGame)
weightedVotingGameVector(n=3,w=c(1,2,3),q=4)
```

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